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Abstract 
This thesis examined the extent to which there is convergence in inflation rates, 
interest rates and incomes in the Common Monetary Area (CMA). It also 
investigated if countries in the area exhibit asymmetric adjustments to aggregate 
shocks. Based on optimum currency area theory, lack of convergence and the 
presence of asymmetric adjustments to shocks is likely to pose serious 
challenges that need to be addressed as the CMA moves towards a fully-fledged 
monetary union. 
 
I formulated and estimated a macroeconomic model to capture the transmission 
of shocks in the CMA. The model consists of four equations namely; Phillips 
curve, IS curve, exchange rate and monetary policy rule. The model links the 
CMA countries via the aggregate demand, inflation and interest rate equations. I 
simulated the model to assess the economic performance of the smaller 
countries when subjected to either a single monetary policy rule or country 
specific monetary policy rules. Such an analysis is used to gauge if a move 
towards a fully-fledged monetary union will result in higher benefits for the 
smaller countries. Furthermore, I estimated a structural VAR model based on the 
theoretical model. The identification restrictions in the VAR are also derived from 
the model. 
 
The analysis confirms monetary convergence, which is supported by the strong 
evidence of co-movement in interest rates and inflation rates in the CMA. 
Monetary convergence is an indicator of strong financial sector integration in the 
area. There is also evidence that inflation in the smaller countries is driven by 
that of South Africa. This result is mainly attributable to the strong trade links in 
the area as well as the existing parity between currencies in the area. The results 
also show that countries in the area are likely to face asymmetric shocks based 
on their composition of exports as well as the low correlation of growth rates. 
However, this asymmetry does not mean that countries cannot move towards 
 iii
creation of a fully-fledged monetary union, but rather that the existing 
asymmetries should be considered seriously by ensuring that other adjustment 
mechanisms are put in place. Extending the analysis to the SADC region shows 
that this region exhibits weak monetary convergence even though the poor 
countries show some form of real convergence with South Africa. Simulations 
from the VAR model show a price puzzle for Swaziland and South Africa but it is 
not prolonged. Based on the analysis the study concludes that a monetary union 
is possible in the CMA and is likely to be less costly. However, the evident 
asymmetries call for gradual step by step phasing in of the monetary union. 
 
Keywords: Monetary union, convergence, asymmetry and monetary policy. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Convergence, Asymmetry and Monetary Policy in a Common 
Monetary Area 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
One of the principles of the New Economic Partnership for Africa’s 
Development (NEPAD), the operational arm of the African Union (AU), is 
acceleration of regional and continental integration. These are seen as a way 
to generate economies of scale found in larger markets and ensure solidarity 
in Africa. It is true that most African countries are small judging by their per 
capita incomes and population sizes. As a result, they fail to provide potential 
investors with enough variety in investment opportunities and attractive 
returns. In the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) 
(2004) report, it is stated that NEPAD was set up to provide a development 
framework premised on regional integration, among other things. The report 
further stipulates that given the challenges posed by regionalism and 
globalisation, African countries stand a better chance if they act collectively to 
reduce marginalisation in the global economy. 
 
According to Masson and Pattillo (2004), motivations for creating currency 
unions, especially in Africa, go beyond the benefits identified under optimum 
currency area (OCA) framework due to Mundell (1961). They believe that it 
can create central bank independence by providing an agency of restraint 
which would create commitment and credibility of monetary authorities. 
Furthermore, besides being able to effectively deal with external challenges, 
Maruping (2005) points out that African governments believe that by joining 
forces they will be better able to create stable macroeconomic environments 
that will effectively stimulate economic activity and sustainable development 
of their economies.  
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In the same light, the AU continues to stress the importance of ensuring that 
all the existing regional economic communities in all four cardinal parts of the 
continent are supported and enhanced. As stated by the Central Bank of 
Swaziland (2006), the AU envisages eventually having a common currency 
and central bank by 2025. This means that all regional integrations can be 
seen as springboards for a united Africa.  
 
Discussion on monetary integration, according to Jefferis (2007), has been at 
the forefront in economic policy discussion agendas mainly because of the 
European and Monetary Union (EMU). When countries form a currency union, 
according to literature on OCA theory, they anticipate the following benefits: 
 
· Reduced transaction costs as they no longer need to convert 
currencies and hedge against exchange risk in transactions among 
partners. Also the costs of translating foreign exchange values for 
corporations and individuals with assets and operations in the 
monetary union. Furthermore, as currencies are phased out 
speculators in those currencies also disappear. 
 
· Increased gains from trade as trade volumes rise and increased 
market access through the creation of a larger regional market. 
However, there is a lot of debate on the impact of monetary unions on 
trade. Some studies have found that the impact on trade can be 
insignificant while others find a significant impact. Recent studies on 
EMU, according to Bonpasse (2006), have found that trade does 
improve but they fail to quantify this result. 
 
· More business cycle synchronisation as countries trade more with 
each other. The congruence in business cycles reduces the costs 
incurred due to the loss of monetary policy autonomy. 
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· Enhanced economic competitiveness due to increased specialization 
by member countries. However, such specialization could result in 
asymmetric business cycles. 
 
· Elimination of nominal exchange rate volatility, hence, lower interest 
rates, lower real exchange rate volatility, deeper financial integration, 
and wider acceptability of currency. 
 
· Low inflation as monetary expansion is constrained and governments 
restrain excessive spending. This enhances the credibility of the 
monetary authorities hence impacting formation of inflation 
expectations by the private sector and individuals. As a result, 
economic growth is enhanced as appropriate investment decisions are 
made. 
 
· Increased asset values as currency risk and interest rates decrease. 
This leads to reduced country risk and increased economic growth and 
national wealth. 
 
· Reduce costs of operating and maintaining a separate monetary 
system. This requires highly qualified personnel to carry out the vast 
complex tasks involved. 
 
· Separate the value of money from the value of a country as the value 
of money in a monetary union depends on the joint custodians of the 
money instead of a single country or the state of the economy or the 
calibre of a country’s leaders. 
 
· Above all, countries expect to enjoy more stable macroeconomic 
environments hence high economic activity, low unemployment rates, 
and higher investment emanating from coordination and harmonisation 
of macroeconomic policy in the region. For instance, in EMU countries 
have to satisfy certain macroeconomic convergence criteria before 
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being allowed to join. The reason being that any domestic crises and 
macroeconomic instability in a member country is likely to have Union 
wide spill-over effects.  
 
These convergence criteria, according to Carr´e (1997), concern 
macroeconomic stability indicators such as budget deficits, public debt ratios, 
inflation rates, interest rates and legislation governing the financial system. 
Aziakpono (2003) notes that even though countries are expected to achieve 
some convergence in policies following integration differences in geographical 
size, population size, socio-cultural diversity, political stability and levels of 
institutional development remain. These tend to lead to heterogeneous 
development patterns among countries. Such differences must be taken into 
account when forming any economic integration as they are likely to instigate 
divergences in economies which may complicate functioning of the grouping. 
 
Monetary integration also poses serious challenges: 
 
· Beetsma and Bovenberg (2001), identify the loss of control over 
monetary and exchange rate policies as tools that can be used to deal 
with domestic or idiosyncratic external shocks. This is because 
common monetary policy will not deal with idiosyncratic shocks which 
may lead to reduced co-movement of macro variables among member 
countries. This requires that other adjustment mechanisms be in place 
to deal with national or country specific shocks, such as wage and 
price flexibilities and capital and labour mobility. 
 
· According to Bean (1992), countries also lose the privilege of 
seigniorage revenue because monetary unification calls for 
convergence of inflation rates and maintenance of low budget deficits 
which cannot be monetised. 
 
· Fears of negative consequences from being associated with less 
successful economies as this can drag more successful economies 
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down resulting in lost credibility in the international economy. They fear 
negative consequences due to adverse selection and moral hazard as 
they are likely to be painted in the same brush. 
 
· Corsettti, Pesenti and Blinder (1999) note that existing asymmetries in 
terms of shocks and monetary policy transmission mechanism among 
countries may be exacerbated if costs and benefits emanating from a 
monetary union are unfairly distributed. This is also supported by 
Hughes-Hallett and Weymark (2001) who further state that 
asymmetries also exist in national preferences for price stability, 
income distribution, and output growth. Dellas and Tavlas (2005) 
argue that the costs of participating in a monetary union for member 
countries tend to rise, the more asymmetric their economic structures 
and nature of shocks are. This is because a common monetary policy 
will not be suitable for all members. 
 
· Further Dellas and Tavlas (2005) note that costs will rise due to the 
nature of existing nominal rigidities. For example, they indicate that if 
countries have the same kind of labour market rigidities they will 
benefit more from forming a monetary union. They use the example of 
the UK, being the country with more flexible wages, and Germany and 
France as having more rigid wage structures. They conclude that the 
UK would incur large costs by joining a union together with these 
countries. They conclude in their study that wage asymmetries tend to 
involve larger welfare effects compared to any other asymmetries 
among countries within a monetary union. 
 
· Feldstein (2005) identifies the inherent conflict between using a single 
currency and operating independent fiscal policies. Governments, he 
argues, as a result tend to run large budget deficits so long as there is 
no market feedback to discipline for such. This creates market failure 
as some countries free ride because they will not face a 
disproportionate share of the resulting burden from running high 
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deficits. This could threaten the stability and survival of the 
arrangement. 
 
· Bordo and Jonung (1999) identify the challenge of ensuring that 
institutions set up to oversee operation of the area have clear and non-
overlapping mandates in order to avoid conflicts and also be able to 
resolve them smoothly should they occur. There should be checks and 
balances to mitigate policy being biased in favour of some countries 
given the existing heterogeneity among countries. There is a lot of 
literature, such as Bordo, and Jonung (1999), Alesina and Perotti 
(2004), Demyanyk and Volosovych (2005), Feldstein (2005), and 
Kocenda et al. (2006), on how EMU institutional set-ups are flawed, 
which may threaten its stability and survival, especially as the 
membership increases. 
 
This study focuses on the impact of monetary policy on economic activity in 
the Common Monetary Area (CMA) which comprises Lesotho, Namibia, 
Swaziland and South Africa. These countries are also members of the 
Southern African Customs Union (SACU), which allows for free trade among 
members and a common external tariff on goods from outside the Union. 
Botswana is also a member of this union. 
 
In the CMA, smaller members enjoy benefits such as relatively stable inflation, 
elimination of uncertainty concerning exchange rate fluctuations which lower 
costs and boosts investor confidence, restraints on government expenditure, 
constrains on monetary expansion as these must be in line with CMA 
guidelines. However, smaller members face constrained monetary and 
exchange rate policies such that they cannot use these to effectively deal with 
domestic or idiosyncratic shocks. Mihov (2001) points out that to the extent 
that such shocks are significant, common monetary policy may worsen 
cyclical misalignments as it will only deal with common shocks. The smaller 
members are also unable to effectively participate in the monetary policy 
formulation process in the area. 
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1.2 History and main features of the CMA 
 
Historically the CMA has undergone various stages and is one of the oldest 
arrangements to have survived together with the financial cooperation in 
Central Africa (CFA) franc zone. Originally, the pound, under British rule, 
followed by the South Africa rand circulated in Botswana, Lesotho and 
Swaziland before these countries gained independence from Britain. 
According to Wang et al. (2007), flows of funds among these countries were 
not restricted and all external transactions were effected by South Africa 
banks subject to their domestic exchange controls. In 1972 negotiations to 
formalize the already existing monetary relationships began after successful 
renegotiation of SACU in 1969. In 1974 the Rand Monetary Area (RMA) 
agreement was signed. However, later in 1975 Botswana pulled out to pursue 
independent monetary policy. According to Grandes (2003), Botswana has 
kept the pula linked to the rand via a currency basket, in which the rand 
weighs 60-70%.  
 
Following major economic events in South Africa, which included the 
depreciation of the rand in 1986, Swaziland renegotiated the RMA. It was then 
replaced by the CMA. Namibia joined in 1992 after gaining independence 
from South Africa in 1990. The main thrust of the CMA as captured in the 
1992 agreement, is to foster and sustain economic development in member 
countries, with special emphasis on the smaller members, by means of 
coordinating monetary and exchange rate arrangements. Furthermore there 
has to be fair and equitable distribution of benefits generated among 
members.  
 
Nielsen et al. (2005) assert that the main goal of monetary policy in the CMA 
is to sustain the pegged exchange rate by upholding enough foreign 
exchange reserves and keeping interest rates at levels that will not result in 
alteration of the peg. Given this, central banks in the smaller members 
influence monetary policy by using a variety of techniques. Namibia uses the 
liquid asset requirements, lending and deposit facilities. Swaziland exercises 
direct control on interest rates to police capital flows and to shield the 
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domestic economy from the effects of monetary policy specifically instituted to 
deal with South African matters. Lesotho uses Treasury bill auctions to 
restrain excess liquidity in the domestic economy. 
 
The prominent features of the CMA include the following: 
 
· Currencies of smaller members are pegged one to one to the South 
African rand. The exchange rates within the CMA are not irrevocably 
fixed. The parity reduces transaction costs among members and 
eliminates exchange rate risks. 
 
· Issue of own currency by member countries which, is legal tender in 
the issuing country. Currencies of smaller members are not legal 
tender in SA but circulate in border areas of South Africa. The note 
issue for Lesotho and Namibia, as stipulated in their bilateral 
agreements, must be backed 100% by foreign reserves to ensure 
discipline, hence stability of the CMA. These reserves could be made 
up of rand balances held by central bank, special rand denominated 
deposit accounts held with South African Reserve bank and South 
African government stock. Smaller members are responsible for their 
monetary policy and control of their financial institutions. Management 
of the Rand currency, gold and foreign exchange reserves of the CMA 
is the prerogative of South Africa. 
 
· Free flow of funds for current and capital account transactions within 
the area except where Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland require funds 
for prescribed financial institutions investment or liquidity purposes. 
This exception permits these countries to curb the flow of funds to 
South Africa where returns are higher. 
 
· Smaller members also have access to South African capital and money 
markets via prescribed investments or approved securities that South 
African financial institutions can hold. This kind of access was expected 
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to make more funds available for development purposes of the smaller 
members. 
 
· Independent authorisation of gold and foreign exchange transactions 
and dealers by individual members, in line with set regulations within 
CMA. Gold and foreign exchange holdings by individuals are subject to 
a surrender requirement in the area. Non-residents of CMA and current 
international transactions face no exchange restrictions. 
 
· Bilateral agreements between South Africa and smaller members that 
govern the latter‘s access to South African foreign exchange markets. 
These safeguard monetary stability within CMA where South Africa 
could give temporary central banking credit facilities. 
 
· Compensatory payments for seigniorage forgone by using the rand, 
applying an established formula stipulated in the CMA agreement. This 
formula is equivalent to the product of two-thirds on the annual yield of 
the most recently issued long-term South African government bond and 
the volume of rand approximated to be circulating in each smaller 
country. In 1986 Swaziland no longer accepted the rand as legal 
tender, even though the rand continued to circulate in the country, and 
as such was no longer eligible for the compensation. Cessation of the 
rand’s legal status also meant that Swaziland no longer needed to 
have a 100% backing for any currency issued thus, affording the 
country extra scope in its reserves management. However, later in 
2003 the legal tender status of the rand was reinstated by the 
government which in a way underscores the importance of the 
compensation revenue for the smaller members. 
 
· Reconciliation of monetary and foreign exchange policies through a 
CMA commission consultative process. The commission meets 
annually, but can also meet at the request of any member, to consider 
matters arising including any changes in the conduct of monetary 
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policy by any member in the area. Central bank Governors also meet 
quarterly ahead of the South African Reserve Bank Monetary Policy 
Committee meetings. However, influence on policy formulation by 
smaller members is constrained as the South African constitution does 
not allow non-South Africans to be part of monetary policy decision 
making process.  
 
Wang et al. (2007), assert that certain features of the CMA are notable when 
compared to those of other monetary integrations in the following ways: First 
and foremost, the CMA is dominated by South Africa which, accounts for over 
90% of the whole area’s GDP, trade and population. This feature is supported 
by table 24. Secondly, the CMA is not a fully-fledged monetary union as there 
is no common central bank, pool of reserves, and regional surveillance of 
domestic fiscal and structural policies. The rand is a de facto common 
currency in the area and conversion from one currency to the other is at zero 
cost making the currencies perfect substitutes. Thirdly, the existing exchange 
rate arrangement of smaller countries resembles that of a currency board 
even though there is no prohibitions on smaller countries holding domestic 
assets as would be the case under a currency board. Further, the parity is not 
irrevocable and there exists no provision for mutual support of the exchange 
rate peg should it come under strain .Fourthly, the CMA is based on SACU, a 
free trade area that entails high capital mobility making it similar to the Euro 
area. Finally, there exist no fiscal transfers among countries to assist them 
deal with asymmetric shocks should they arise. 
 
In support of the above comparison, Grandes (2003) argues that indeed the 
CMA is a hybrid of a currency board and a monetary union. The rand is the 
dominant currency; however, countries have not made an irrevocable 
commitment to maintain a given parity. Foreign assets back domestic 
currency issuance and the monetisation of fiscal deficits is not allowed making 
it a currency board. According to Masson and Pattillo (2004), the CMA is 
therefore eclectic and highly adaptable, factors that are likely to have 
contributed to its survival over the years. They further argue that the relative 
size of member countries ensures that the responsibility of monetary policy 
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lies with the bigger partner, a factor that has contributed to its continued 
existence. Wang et al. (2007) argue that the survival of the CMA can therefore 
be attributed to, among other things, political and historical factors. The 
commitment of a hegemonic power therefore is often cited in the literature as 
a precondition for the success of a monetary union. 
 
Table 1 Features of monetary unions 
 WAEMU CAEMC Euro 
Area 
CMA 
Membership 
Single currency? 
 
Common central bank? 
 
Common pool of reserves? 
Regional surveillance of 
fiscal policy? 
Free trade area? 
Degree of capital mobility 
within region? 
External exchange rate 
anchor? 
 
8 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Yes 
 
No 
Low 
 
Yes, peg 
Euro 
6 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Yes 
 
No 
Low 
 
Yes, peg 
Euro 
12 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Yes 
 
Yes 
High 
 
No 
4 
No, but de facto 
common currency 
No, but SARB has 
immense influence 
No 
No 
 
Yes 
High 
 
No 
Source: Wang et al. (2007) 
Note: WAEMU=West African Economic and Monetary Union 
 CAEMU=Central African Economic and Monetary Union 
 SARB= South African Reserve Bank 
 
Table 1 provides a brief summary of the main features of four different 
monetary unions and it brings out how the CMA differs from existing monetary 
unions. In the CMA there is no single currency but the rand is legal tender in 
all the smaller countries. However, currencies of the smaller countries are not 
legal tender in South Africa. There is also no common central bank as each 
country has its own central bank however; monetary policy set in South Africa 
by the SARB de facto applies to the whole area. This is because of the fact 
that currencies of the smaller countries are at par with the South African rand. 
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Regional surveillance of fiscal policy is not applicable in the CMA but fiscal 
policy is somehow constrained due to the CMA. 
 
1.3 Monetary policy in the CMA 
 
The primary focus of monetary policy in South Africa is to stabilise the value 
of the rand in an effort to promote balanced and sustainable growth of the 
economy. The SARB follows an inflation-targeting framework introduced in 
the year 2000. According to Aron and Muellbauer (2006), adoption of this 
framework was intended to improve policy so that it is more predictable, 
transparent and policymakers are more accountable. Under the framework, 
the target for the consumer price index (CPIX), excluding the mortgage 
interest rate, is between 3 and 6 per cent per year. The main instruments of 
monetary policy include the repurchase rate (repo rate) and open market 
operations. 
 
Monetary policy in the rest of the CMA centres on protecting the pegged 
exchange rate by preserving adequate foreign exchange reserves. The 
smaller members have to back all domestic currency issued with these 
reserves. Interest rates are also kept in line with those pertaining in South 
Africa to avoid any distortions to the fixed exchange rate. Nevertheless the 
smaller members have set up various ways that they use, to a limited extent, 
to direct monetary policy in their countries, which is to a large extent is 
influenced by monetary policy in South Africa.  
 
The bank of Namibia uses the bank rate to influence commercial banks’ 
reserves. It also uses the call rate, defined as the rate paid to commercial 
banks on funds kept on a short-term basis with the central bank. The reserve 
requirement is used, but its use is limited because most of the commercial 
banks in the country are owned by South African banks. The Central Bank of 
Swaziland uses the discount rate, reserve and liquidity requirements, open 
market operations, and moral suasion. The bank ensures that interest rate 
differentials with South Africa are at their lowest. This helps to manage capital 
flows and shield the economy from any negative consequences from 
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monetary policy instituted by South Africa. The Central Bank of Lesotho 
(CBL)’s principal mandate is price stability followed by anchoring monetary 
policy to that of South Africa through the rand-loti peg. The CBL utilises open 
market operations to regulate domestic banking sector liquidity and maintain 
adequate reserves to support the peg. 
 
1.4 Statement of the problem 
 
Recent developments in international monetary arrangements, including the 
launch of the Euro, have led to considerable debate and analysis of the 
economic effects of currency unions (See: Frankel and Rose (1996a) Hughes-
Hallet, and Weymark (2001), Mongelli (2002), Ternreyo and Barro (2003). 
Masson and Pattillo (2004), and Adams (2005). Under a currency union, 
countries forego individual monetary and exchange rate policy autonomy. 
They create a common central bank responsible for conducting monetary 
policy based on economic situations for the entire union. The CMA is a non-
fully fledged monetary union and monetary policy, set in South Africa, based 
on domestic factors, de facto applies across the area. Currencies of smaller 
members are not irrevocably linked to the rand so smaller members are free 
to deviate from the peg. Furthermore, there is no adjustment mechanism in 
place to support economies in the event of asymmetric shocks and regional 
surveillance of domestic fiscal and structural policies is absent. 
 
This study seeks to investigate if a move to a fully-fledged monetary union 
would be more beneficial or detrimental compared to the current arrangement. 
Masson and Pattillo (2004) indicate that the South African Reserve Bank 
Governor, though not optimistic, mentioned that they would consider if a move 
towards a multilateral monetary union, hence a common central bank, is 
feasible. The smaller members have noted with great concern that they have 
very limited, if any, influence over monetary policy in the area. This is 
particularly more important now for the smaller members whose economies 
continue to show poor performance compared to the South African economy. 
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According to Sander and Kleimeier (2006), Grandes (2003) and Wang et al. 
(2007), the four countries conduct a hybrid of a currency board and a 
monetary union arrangement. The rand is the anchor currency in the area. 
Masson and Pattillo (2004), note that monetary policy in the CMA is set by the 
South African Reserve bank based primarily on domestic South Africa 
objectives. This makes the arrangement asymmetric as it represents interests 
of the dominant partner. The smaller countries have raised this issue on 
numerous occasions and have continued to deliberate on ways to ensure their 
active participation in monetary policy decision making. The movement 
towards a full monetary union is viewed as an essential move for better 
monetary policy coordination and harmonization in the area. In addition, such 
a move is also viewed as a means to generate improved responses to both 
supply and demand shocks in member countries, particularly the small 
countries. It is therefore important to investigate how the monetary policy 
actions instituted by the South African Reserve Bank affect the smaller 
countries. Such an exercise will help determine if the arrangement’s objective, 
that is, development of the whole area with particular emphasis on the smaller 
members, is being satisfied. 
 
CMA members are different in terms of economic, financial, institutional and 
legal structures despite the strong existing ties among them which date back 
to the colonial era. Trade statistics in the area show that trade flow is one 
way, from smaller members to South Africa. The latter’s main trade partners 
are the UK, EU and the US. Smaller CMA members are highly dependent on 
imports from South Africa but they export relatively less to South Africa, with 
the exception of Swaziland. According to Rose (2000), there is empirical 
evidence on the probable endogenous link between trade and monetary 
integration. This means that it is likely that CMA countries will exhibit even 
greater trade ties due to the monetary arrangement in place.  
 
However, it appears that intra-zone trade intensities, as noted by Grandes 
(2003), have not been appreciably enhanced by the monetary arrangement in 
the area. Furthermore, these countries show some divergences in terms of 
trade shocks, especially Namibia, mainly because of differences in the 
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composition of their exports and imports. Such differences indicate that 
idiosyncratic shocks are likely to persist. Under a monetary union, monetary 
policy cannot be used to cushion individual economies against such shocks. 
The current arrangement has been stable since inception despite all the 
differences that exist in the area. Whether a fully-fledged monetary union 
would also be stable will depend critically on the institutional set up and the 
political will to ensure that it survives, especially on the part of the larger 
country.  
 
Against this background, it becomes important to investigate monetary policy 
transmission mechanism in the CMA. Specifically, the study will focus on the 
following research questions: 
 
1) What are the channels through which monetary policy actions instituted 
by the South African Reserve bank are propagated to the smaller 
members in the CMA? 
2) Are the responses to monetary policy and other aggregate shocks from 
SA the same across CMA member countries?   
3) Are member countries’ monetary policies coordinated and harmonised 
in any way to promote convergence and co-movement in 
macroeconomic variables in economies of the whole monetary area? 
4) Is there any scope for smaller members to respond to idiosyncratic 
shocks should they choose to pursue independent monetary policy? 
 
1.5. Study Objectives 
 
The study seeks to analyse the monetary policy transmission mechanism in 
the CMA. The specific objectives are: 
 
· Analyse how smaller members are impacted by shocks instituted by 
South Africa authorities. This is useful for Lesotho, Namibia and 
Swaziland governments to know so that they fully understand what to 
expect from certain policy interventions.  
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· Establish if the smaller members enjoy the benefits expected, 
especially macroeconomic stability, from being integrated with the 
larger more sophisticated and developed South Africa economy.  
 
· Shed more light on how monetary policy affects the economy, 
especially small open developing countries. It is important for 
policymakers, especially in developing countries where the 
transmission mechanism is less understood, to understand the 
transmission mechanism so that appropriate growth enhancing policies 
are instituted.  
 
This study is therefore a useful input in the on-going discussions by central 
bank governors in the CMA on moving towards a fully-fledged monetary 
union. Such discussions are a stepping stone to the AU’s dream of a common 
currency and central bank for the African continent. 
 
1.6 Layout of the thesis 
 
The rest of the thesis is organised as follows: 
· Chapter 2 measures convergence and asymmetries in CMA countries. 
I will measure convergence using three methods namely: error 
correction model, univariate analysis, and a b -convergence model. 
These capture the extent to which the CMA economies are integrated 
and the degree to which monetary policy is harmonised in the area. To 
measure asymmetry of business cycles, I will use correlation of growth 
rates and the composition of exports in the area. For comparative 
purposes, I analyse the level of convergence and asymmetry in the rest 
of the SADC countries. 
 
· Chapter 3 formulates and estimates a structural macroeconomic model 
that will be used to simulate the behaviour of member countries in 
response to aggregate shocks. The theoretical framework used to 
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formulate the model underpins the vision of the transmission of 
aggregate shocks across the CMA and within member countries. 
·  Chapter 4 details the VAR approach and analysis of generated 
impulse response functions. This will provide a robustness check of 
how close the theoretical model replicates the empirical dynamics. 
· Chapter 5 proffers the overall conclusions for the study derived from 
the analysis. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Convergence and Asymmetries in the CMA and SADC 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter examines the extent to which there is convergence and 
asymmetric adjustments to aggregate shocks in the economies of the 
Common Monetary Area (CMA). Macroeconomic convergence and 
asymmetric adjustments are crucial issues if the CMA is to evolve into a fully-
fledged monetary union. Frankel and Rose (1996a), Calderon et al. (2003), 
Masson and Pattillo (2004), and Cheung and Yuen (2004), among others, 
indicate that standard literature on Optimum Currency Areas (OCA), which 
dates back to Mundell (1961) and McKinnon (1963), identifies some key 
criteria in determining if countries are suitable candidates for a monetary 
union. Firstly, countries must exhibit close international trade links. Secondly, 
business cycles for potential members must be synchronised. Thirdly, 
member countries must also have flexible labour and capital markets. 
 
Close international trade links are important in a monetary union because the 
benefits derived from the reduction in transaction costs will be larger as trade 
and investment flows intensify among members. Such transactions costs 
include costs of converting currencies, and costs incurred in hedging against 
exchange rate risks and uncertainty. Synchronised business cycles reduce 
the costs incurred as a result of giving up the use of monetary and exchange 
rate policies as stabilisation tools. The effectiveness of a common monetary 
policy is curtailed when at the same time the dominant economy faces a 
contractionary phase of the business cycle while others are on an 
expansionary phase. This is because the common monetary policy will fail to 
stabilise both economies simultaneously. Such occurrences complicate the 
decision making process within the union and may even threaten its very 
existence. According to Dellas and Tavlas (2004), a major result in the 
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literature on OCA is that the costs faced by countries engaged in a monetary 
union will be higher if they face asynchronised business cycles.  
 
Flexibility in the labour market ensures access to alternative adjustment 
mechanisms given that the use of monetary and exchange rate policies is 
restrained. Such flexibility therefore acts as a shock absorber. When one 
country faces a shock resulting in a slump, which in turn leads to a rise in 
unemployment, then labour can move to other member countries to find work. 
This will ease the pressure and reduce the burden of adjustment costs in the 
affected member. According to Dellas and Tavlas (2005), the costs of forming 
a monetary union will rise due to the nature of existing nominal rigidities. For 
example, if countries have the same kind of labour market rigidities they will 
benefit more from forming a monetary union because their adjustment 
processes following any shock will be similar. 
 
It is important to note that the OCA criteria noted above are treated as 
exogenous in the traditional OCA literature. However, studies such as Frankel 
and Rose (1996a and 1996b) argue that these criteria are endogenous. They 
are reinforced by the creation of a monetary union. This implies that 
candidates of a monetary union can satisfy the OCA criteria ex-post rather 
than ex-ante. This is due to the fact that economic structures are expected to 
be transformed as countries join a monetary union. This means that the 
conclusions reached using historical data; to establish if countries should form 
such a grouping need to be evaluated carefully. Countries may appear to be 
unsuitable candidates for a monetary union when in fact they are. Adams 
(2005) highlights that political factors play a pivotal role in determining the 
formation and success of currency unions. This study examines only 
economic factors, as they are likely to shape political factors. 
 
According to Debrun et al. (2003) and Jeffris (2007), the success story of the 
European Union has made currency unions a topical issue in policy 
discussions the world over. In the CMA discussions are already underway on 
establishing a fully-fledged monetary union. Tavlas (2007) asserts that the 
CMA is dominated by South Africa, which accounts for approximately 95% of 
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the whole area’s GDP. It is not a fully-fledged monetary union because there 
is no common central bank, pool of reserves and regional surveillance of 
domestic fiscal and structural policies. CMA countries have very strong 
economic links, which date back to the colonial era. They are also members 
of the Southern African Customs Union, a free trade area that entails a high 
degree of capital mobility, making it similar to the Euro area. Most of the 
features of the CMA resemble closely those of the European Union. Given the 
foregoing evidence, should the CMA form a fully-fledged monetary union?  
 
Studies on the feasibility of forming a well-functioning monetary union focus 
on measuring convergence and asymmetry of business cycles among 
members. To measure these, studies such as Anthony and Hughes-Hallett 
(2000), Wang et al. (2007), Kocenda et al. (2006), and Eichengreen and 
Bayoumi (1996) focus on GDP growth rates, inflation rates and interest rates. 
In this chapter I assess the behaviour of these variables to identify if there is 
any convergence and asymmetry within the CMA. First, I measure 
convergence using an error-correction model premised on the assumption 
that variables in the smaller countries follow those of the larger country in the 
area. This model is an extension of the model by Wang et al. (2007). I also 
measure b –convergence to gauge if the smaller countries tend to catch up 
with the larger country overtime as in Kocenda et al. (2006). Furthermore, I 
apply univariate modelling to assess if overtime the variables of interest in the 
member countries tend to move towards the same long run equilibrium 
values. I measure asymmetry using the correlation of countries GDP growth 
rates to that of the area as a whole. I also consider the composition of 
countries’ exports as a proxy for the likely presence of asymmetric shocks in 
the CMA. 
 
I find strong evidence of co-movement in inflation rates and interest rates. 
This is not surprising because smaller members import over 80% from South 
Africa. It is also ascribed to the existing parity between currencies in the area, 
which makes the inflation targeting framework followed by South Africa, de 
facto applicable to the whole area. Interest rates in the CMA have fallen 
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overtime and they move together, reflecting the existing close integration of 
the financial sectors in the area. The behaviour of inflation and interest rates 
confirms monetary convergence, hence nominal convergence, in the area. 
Per capita income dispersions have fallen over time, indicating some real 
convergence. I also find that countries in the CMA are likely to face 
asymmetric shocks given the differences in their compositions of exports. The 
asymmetry of shocks is also supported by the low correlation between growth 
rates for the smaller members and that of the whole area. Nevertheless this 
does not vitiate a move towards creating a common Central Bank. For 
example, within South Africa some regions’ growth rates exhibit a similar 
pattern but they all face the same monetary policy implemented by the 
Reserve bank. 
 
I extend the study to the SADC region and find that, with the exception of 
Angola, Botswana and Mauritius display high per capita income dispersions. 
The region also shows weak monetary convergence, which indicates low 
financial sector integration that would make it difficult for countries to 
implement uniform monetary policy. The poor countries namely, Angola, 
Tanzania, Zambia, Mozambique, Congo DR, show high correlation with that 
of South Africa as well as the whole CMA. This indicates some real 
convergence and the extent of their dependence on South Africa. These 
countries therefore exhibit synchronised business cycles which would make 
them suitable candidates for a monetary union. 
 
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows: Section 2.2 presents 
measures of convergence followed by measures of asymmetry in section 2.3. 
The empirical analysis is presented in section 2.4. Synchronisation of 
business cycles of South Africa and its provinces is in section 2.5 followed by 
a presentation on convergence and asymmetry in the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) in section 2.6. The conclusion is in section 
2.7. 
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2.2 Measures of Convergence  
 
In this study I use three measures of convergence. Firstly, I use an error 
correction model, which is a modification of Wang et al. (2007). It assumes 
that key macroeconomic variables of smaller members are affected by those 
of the larger country in any monetary grouping. Given the hegemonic role of 
the larger country, there is no feedback effect expected from smaller 
economies to the larger country. Furthermore, in the short run, should there 
be any deviation of the smaller country’s variables from those of the larger 
country, an adjustment process is triggered until they equalize. The 
adjustment speed varies across smaller countries depending on a variety of 
factors such as differences in economic and institutional structures. 
 
The model is specified as follows:  
 
)( 1*1
*
--- -+D+D+=D å tttjt
j
jt XXXXX gbqa       (1) 
 
tX  represents either inflation, GDP or interest rates and tX
*  represents the 
relevant variable for the larger economy, b  captures short term response of 
tX  in each of the smaller members to changes in the larger country variable, 
tX * . The convergence speed to long run equilibrium values for each variable 
is captured byg  and q  measures the presence of persistence in each of the 
variables. Persistence gives an indication of differences in economic and 
institutional structures among countries. The convergence speed variable 
must be negative to support that smaller countries adjust their variables 
should they deviate from those of the larger country. If it happens to be zero 
this would indicate that there is no relationship among these economies. A 
positive convergence speed coefficient would indicate that if divergences 
occur they would be persistent. 
 
In eq. (1) variables of the smaller member countries are assumed to be linear 
functions of the larger country in the long run. For example, this means that 
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interest rates in the smaller countries follow those of the dominant partner. 
There is no feedback effect expected given the hegemonic role played by the 
dominant partner in the area. In this case interest rates adjust to the long run 
equilibrium rate should there be any disturbance to the linear relationship. The 
same reasoning applies to inflation rates and GDP growth rates in the area. 
 
I assume that the variables for the larger country are driven by the following 
process: 
 
tjtjjt XX eqd ++= -å **        (2) 
 
Eq. (2) presents the larger country equation which captures internal 
persistence. 
  
To examine if all member countries tend to converge towards the same long 
run equilibrium inflation, interest and growth rates values I use univariate time 
series models. This second measure of convergence is given by the following 
model: 
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Where tX  represents inflation rate, interest rate and growth rates.  
 
The third measure is based on Kocenda et al. (2006). It captures the extent to 
which smaller countries catch-up with the larger country overtime. It measures 
convergence towards a benchmark. They argue that this measure has 
recently been used on time series methods to capture a second dimension to 
b -convergence. This is because most cross-sectional tests used tended to 
over-reject the null hypothesis of no convergence. The model is given as: 
 
tt utx ++= ad         (4) 
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Where; tx  is the percentage deviation of a small country variable from that of 
a large country variable, d  captures the original deviations in the variable of 
interest between two countries, t is a time trend and tu  is a random error. In 
this setting b –convergence occurs if first, on the onset d  is negative and 
statistically significant. This would indicate that the small country is lagging 
behind the larger country. Second the time-trend coefficient a  should be 
positive and statistically significant, indicating that overtime the lagging 
country catches up with the leader. In this study tx  is the percentage deviation 
of real per capita GDP of the smaller countries from that of the larger country.  
 
2.3 Measures of Asymmetry 
 
At the core of the debate on whether countries should form monetary unions 
is the extent to which they exhibit synchronised business cycles. 
Asychronised business cycles within potential members of monetary unions, 
based on traditional OCA literature, indicate that countries do not form an 
OCA. In such a case they would not be suitable candidates for such a 
grouping. This is because such asymmetry can lead to complications in the 
decision making process of the union leading to its collapse. Corsetti and 
Pesenti (1999), argue that many of those who were opposed to the idea of a 
common currency emphasized that Europe was more heterogeneous than the 
United States. In their view, this meant that Europe was more prone to 
asymmetric shocks, which would be solved by allowing exchange rates to be 
flexible. Therefore, in monetary integration literature, emphasis is on 
synchronisation of business cycles. Hence, symmetry of shocks is one of the 
key prerequisite for establishing a monetary union. 
 
The first asymmetry measure I use in this study is based on Anthony and 
Hughes-Hallett’s (2000) study on the Caribbean monetary union. It examines 
the correlation between annual GDP growth of each member country and 
GDP growth of the whole area. This measure captures the extent to which 
member countries will be subject to the same shocks given the observed 
differences in their economies. These include differences in size, cultures, 
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economic, and institutional structures. In Mihov (2001) and Demyanyk and 
Volosovych (2005), this measure is identified as a conventional way of 
measuring synchronization of economic activity. Low correlation is interpreted 
to mean that countries could be subject to asymmetric shocks. Kalemli-Ozcan 
et al. (2004) and Eichengreen and Bayoumi (1996), also stress that if 
economies face asymmetric shocks it means that they show asymmetry in 
GDP. They argue that to the extent that large GDP asymmetries exist, the 
monetary union may reduce welfare because individual countries lose 
monetary policy autonomy. In such a situation, it is only if there exist risks 
sharing mechanisms such as fiscal transfers that the costs of adjusting to 
shocks will be reduced. 
 
The other measure I use is based on Eichengreen and Bayoumi (1996) and 
Wang et al. (2007). It uses differences in the composition of exports among 
union members as a proxy for the asymmetry of shocks. The argument is that 
when member countries export the same products, industry specific shocks 
will be more symmetric. As countries face symmetric shocks, such as terms of 
trade shocks, their business cycles would tend to become more and more 
symmetric, making them good candidates for a monetary union. 
 
2.4 Empirical Analysis 
 
2.4.1 Data Description and Sources 
 
I use annual data sourced from the International Finance Statistics (IFS) and 
World Development Indicators (WDI). Interest rate data for Namibia begins in 
1993 as the country gained independence in 1990. I estimate eq. (1) to (4) 
using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). The lag length is chosen using the 
Akaike Information Criteria (AIC). Using the results from the error-correction 
model I carry out simulations to observe how CMA country variables under 
study behave when subjected to a shock. I also run Granger-causality tests 
and see how they compare with the results from the error correction model. 
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Table 2 Data description 
Sample Variables Description 
1980-2006 Interest rate 
Inflation rate 
Growth rate 
Real GDP per 
Capita 
Lending rate 
Consumer Price Annual % change 
Real GDP annual % growth 
GDP constant US $ divided by 
population 
Note: Interest rate and inflation rate data for Namibia cover the period 1993-2006 and 1981-
2006 respectively. 
 
The data I use in this study, as shown in table 2, are annual data from 1980 to 
2006, drawn mainly from the IFS, African Development Bank (ADB) statistics 
pocket book and WDI. I use annual data because quarterly data are not easy 
to find for all the countries and in some cases are not reliable and have gaps. 
Data set for Namibia interest rates start in 1993 as the country gained 
independence in 1991. 
 
2.4.2 Empirical Evidence on Convergence in the CMA: Error-Correction model 
 
Estimating eqs. (1) and (2) for each of the variables yields the results 
presented in table 3. The appropriate lag length for eqs. (1) and (2) is chosen 
using the AIC. 
 
Table 3 Error-correction model results for selected macro-variables 
 
 
 
Lesotho 
 
Namibia 
 
Swaziland 
 trD  tpD  tyD  trD  tpD  tyD  trD  tpD  tyD  
b  
g  
 
1q  
2q  
0.70 
(0.07) 
-0.23 
(0.11) 
0.20 
(0.08) 
-0.17 
(0.08) 
0.71 
(0.22) 
-0.97 
(0.18) 
0.74 
(0.19) 
-0.30 
(0.16) 
0.73 
(0.10) 
-0.57 
(0.23) 
0.72 
(0.20) 
-0.52 
(0.18) 
0.91 
(0.45) 
-1.33 
(0.28) 
-0.04 
(0.19) 
0.85 
(0.11) 
-0.25 
(0.17) 
-0.24 
(0.11) 
1.03 
(0.38) 
-1.11 
(0.20) 
0.70 
(0.31) 
-0.67 
(0.17) 
2R  
S.E. 
AIC 
0.90 
0.82 
2.64 
0.58 
2.70 
4.91 
0.56 
2.34 
4.65 
0.83 
0.72 
2.37 
0.51 
2.25 
4.57 
0.89 
1.69 
4.13 
0.72 
1.42 
3.66 
0.53 
4.35 
5.87 
0.46 
4.17 
5.80 
Note: Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. tr = Interest rate. tp = Inflation rate. ty = 
growth rates. 
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The results indicate that interest rates in the smaller countries are highly 
influenced by those of the larger country, South Africa. This is shown by the 
coefficient b  which is large and significant with the correct sign for all the 
smaller members. The coefficient g , which captures the speed of 
convergence in interest rates in the long run, ranges between -0.23 to -0.57. 
For Swaziland, though the convergence coefficient has the right sign, it is not 
significant. Lesotho has the lowest convergence coefficient, though not 
significantly different from that of Swaziland. This could be due to the 
underdevelopment of the financial sector in Lesotho. 
 
The results also show that inflation rates in South Africa affect those of the 
smaller countries as captured by b . This coefficient has the right sign and is 
statistically significant for all countries. It is much higher for Swaziland at 1.03 
and very similar for Namibia and Lesotho at 0.71 and 0.72 respectively. The 
convergence speed is higher for Swaziland at -1.11 followed by Lesotho at -
0.97 and Namibia at -0.52. For all the countries there is no evidence of 
persistence in inflation. This is shown by the insignificance of the coefficients. 
These results are reasonable given that smaller countries rely heavily on 
imports from South Africa. Further, the currencies of member countries are 
pegged one-to-one to the rand. This makes the inflation targeting framework 
being pursued by South Africa applicable to the whole area. 
 
GDP growth in Swaziland, Lesotho and Namibia is positively related to growth 
in South Africa as captured by the b  coefficients. The g  coefficients show 
that there is convergence in the long run. This is shown by the significance of 
the coefficients, which also carry the correct signs. The convergence speed 
for Swaziland, Lesotho, and Namibia is -0.67, -0.30 and -1.33 respectively. 
For Namibia, the reported persistence is insignificant. It is however important 
to note that the model does not include other factors, such as structure of 
economies, and level of quality of production factors that influence economic 
activity in each economy. However, the results obtained are useful in that they 
bring out that growth in South Africa does influence that of the smaller 
countries. 
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In general, these results are the same as those found by Wang et al. (2007). 
Slight differences reflect the inclusion of persistence parameters and the use 
of annual data. For Lesotho and Swaziland, there is persistence in interest 
rates, which indicates that adjustment following any disturbance will be 
gradual rather than fast and immediate. As a result, current lending rates in 
Lesotho and Swaziland will be affected by their past two and one year values 
respectively.  
 
Using the results shown in table 2, simulation of the behaviour of the 
economies of the CMA when faced with a 1% percent shock from South 
Africa yields the responses in figure 1. The graphs show that following the 
shock, in the very short run economies may react differently. However, they 
tend to behave the same way as they approach long run equilibrium together. 
This indicates that there is convergence in the CMA in terms of inflation, 
interest and GDP growth rates. This means that business cycles of these 
economies should be fairly synchronised. 
 
Figure 1 Error-Correction Model results simulations 
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The behaviour of inflation in the CMA is further supported by evidence from 
running Granger-causality tests. These tests are based on the assumption 
that causality in inflation is unidirectional from South Africa to the smaller 
members. This assumption is based on the hegemonic role South Africa plays 
in the area. The results presented in table 4 show that inflation in the smaller 
countries is Granger-caused by inflation in South Africa.  
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Table 4 Pairwise Granger-Causality Tests: Inflation in the CMA 
Null Hypothesis F-Stat Prob 
South Africa inflation does not Granger-cause Swaziland inflation 
Swaziland inflation does not Granger-cause South Africa inflation 
South Africa inflation does not Granger-cause Lesotho inflation 
Lesotho inflation does not Granger-cause South Africa 
South Africa inflation does not Granger-cause Namibia inflation** 
Namibia inflation does not Granger-cause South Africa inflation 
7.00 
2.42 
16.52 
0.29 
10.03 
1.45 
0.0 
0.13 
0.0 
0.59 
0.0 
0.24 
Note: **No. of observations for Namibia is 25 compared to 31 used for Lesotho and 
Swaziland. F-Stat= F-Statistic and Prob= probability. 
 
The close co-movement of inflation in the CMA supports a finding by Tenreyro 
and Barro (2003) that a common currency increases price co-movements as 
shown in figure 2. Since inception of the inflation targeting framework in South 
Africa inflation rates in the area move even closer. This is also supported by 
table 24 in the appendix. 
 
Figure 2 Inflation in the CMA 
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In the literature on OCA trade integration is one of the key criteria used to 
determine if countries are suitable candidates for a currency union. This is 
because as trade integration intensifies business cycles tend to be more 
synchronised. However, Frankel and Rose (1996a) point out that from a 
theoretical point of view, as trade intensifies among countries; it could lead to 
either synchronous or asynchronous business cycles. This is because 
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countries could become more specialised in their production, leading to 
idiosyncratic cycles as noted among others by Eichengreen (1992) and 
Krugman (1993). On the other hand, business cycles could become more 
synchronised if intra-industry trade intensifies, demand shocks preponderate, 
and when countries face common shocks. 
 
Table 5 CMA Direction of trade, 2003 
Trade direction Lesotho Namibia South Africa Swaziland 
Exports to: 
South Africa 
Europe 
United States 
Rest of world 
Exports/GDP* 
Imports from: 
South Africa 
Europe 
United States 
Rest of world 
Imports/GDP* 
 
19.4 
0.1 
79.8 
0.7 
46.0 
 
86.0 
0.1 
0.2 
13.7 
84.4 
 
28.6 
49.7 
5.9 
15.8 
47.4 
 
81.5 
6.2 
0.8 
11.5 
46.5 
 
7.3 
30.6 
9.7 
59.7 
30.8 
 
1.3 
43.4 
9.7 
46.9 
34.5 
 
68.2 
1.9 
9.1 
20.9 
80.5 
 
89.0 
1.2 
0.3 
9.6 
86.8 
Source: World Economic Outlook (2007) and Wang et al. (2007). * indicates figures 
for 2007. 
 
From table 5, it emerges that the smaller members are more open, especially 
Lesotho and Swaziland, judging from the exports and imports to GDP ratios. 
They are also highly dependent on imports from South Africa, which account 
for over 80% of total imports. For Lesotho and Namibia, most of their exports 
are destined for the US, about 80% and Europe about 50%. Swaziland on the 
other hand, exports over 68% to South Africa which is much higher compared 
to what the other smaller members export to South Africa. South Africa on the 
other hand is engaged in trade with countries outside the CMA. According to 
Grandes (2003), intra-industry trade does not seem to have intensified in the 
area. Hence, member countries are likely to face asymmetric shocks leading 
to divergences in business cycles. 
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Figure 3 plots GDP per capita for countries in the CMA. It depicts the extent to 
which income gaps have fallen over the years among members. 
Figure 3 GDP per capita for CMA countries (in thousands constant 2000 US$) 
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Source: World Development indicators, 2007 
 
The graph shows that there has been some convergence within these 
countries in the last two decades as evidenced by slight narrowing of income 
dispersions,s -convergence. This supports the conclusion made by Masson 
and Pattillo (2004), Jefferis (2007), and Wang et al. (2007), that the CMA 
forms a core convergence club or group. From figure 3, the gap in per capita 
incomes between South Africa, the richest member, and the poorest country 
in per capita terms, Lesotho, has continued to decrease over the years. From 
the late nineties, Swaziland has been faced with a serious slowdown in 
economic activity while growth in South Africa has been robust. Should this 
pattern continue, per capita income dispersions are likely to grow larger. 
 
2.4.3 Univariate Modelling 
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Estimating eq. (3), I test if countries converge to the same long run equilibrium 
values, denoted by **X . The results are displayed in table 6 below.  
 34
Table 6 Univariate modelling results 
Parameters Lesotho Namibia South Africa Swaziland 
 
1b  
2b  
3b  
4b  
0b  
**X  
r p  yD  r p  yD  r p  yD  r p  yD  
0.93 
(0.18) 
-0.53 
(0.17) 
 
 
 
9.75 
(2.79) 
16.25 
0.56 
(0.16) 
 
 
 
 
 
4.86 
(1.95) 
11.05 
0.44 
(0.18) 
 
 
 
 
 
2.00 
(0.92) 
3.64 
0.96 
(0.15) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.14 
(2.46) 
3.5 
0.64 
(0.16) 
 
 
 
 
 
3.38 
(1.81) 
9.39 
-0.53 
(0.23) 
 
 
 
 
 
6.51 
(1.14) 
4.25 
0.98 
(0.18) 
-0.39 
(0.18) 
 
 
 
6.43 
(2.28) 
15.68 
1.02 
(0.19) 
-0.16 
(0.20) 
 
 
 
1.23 
(1.20) 
9.46 
0.34 
(0.18) 
 
 
 
 
 
1.45 
(0.61) 
2.2 
0.72 
(0.13) 
 
 
 
 
 
4.03 
(1.88) 
14.39 
0.37 
(0.17) 
0.23 
(0.18) 
 
 
 
4.00 
(2.86) 
10.00 
0.53 
(0.17) 
0.20) 
(0.14) 
 
 
 
1.16 
(1.04) 
4.30 
2R  
)2(2c AIC 
0.55 
3.03 
(0.22) 
4.26 
0.30 
4.85 
(0.08) 
5.48 
0.20 
2.74 
(0.25) 
5.1 
0.79 
0.81 
(0.67) 
3.99 
0.40 
2.75 
(0.25) 
5.01 
0.28 
4.39 
(0.11) 
4.51 
0.58 
1.45 
(0.48) 
4.83 
0.76 
5.44 
(0.07) 
4.54 
0.13 
0.37 
(0.83) 
4.52 
0.53 
4.31 
(0.51) 
4.61 
0.22 
4.41 
(0.11) 
5.93 
0.41 
2.84 
(0.24) 
5.01 
Note: Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. r = Interest rate. p = Inflation rate. yD = growth rates. X** represents calculated equilibrium values. 
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The equilibrium interest rates for Lesotho, South Africa, and Swaziland are not 
very different. For Namibia however, the equilibrium value is too low at about 4%. 
This could be attributable to the short data series used. For inflation, the 
equilibrium values in the same order are very close to each other. This is to be 
expected given the close financial integration between these countries, which 
was earlier confirmed by the presence of nominal convergence in the area. 
Equilibrium figures for growth are around 4% with the exception of South Africa 
with a figure of about 2%.  
 
Overall the results confirm close integration of financial sectors as they tend to 
converge to the same long run interest rates. Inflation behaviour in the long run 
also shows convergence. The inflation targeting followed by South Africa, as well 
as the parity among the currencies in the area has led to this behaviour in 
interest and inflation rates. 
 
2.4.4 b -Convergence Model in the CMA 
 
In this subsection I measure the extent to which the smaller countries in the CMA 
catch up with the dominant partner, South Africa. For b -convergence to occur, 
the country lagging behind initially must catch up with the per capita income of 
the larger country. If convergence occurs, then countries are better candidates 
for a monetary union. I measure b -convergence by estimating a model based on 
Kocenda et al. (2006) specified in eq. (4), which yields the results in table 7 
below: 
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Table 7 b -convergence results 
 
Parameters 
 
Lesotho 
 
Namibia 
 
Swaziland 
d  
a  
 
2R  
Residua(-1) 
-3.26 
(0.05) 
0.04 
(0.003) 
0.88 
 
-1.30 
(0.04) 
0.01 
(0.002) 
0.67 
 
-3.13 
(0.03) 
0.02 
(0.002) 
0.94 
0.99 
(0.07) 
Note: Standard errors are in parenthesis. The results for Swaziland were corrected for serial 
correlation. 
 
For all three countries, the initial deviation shows that they are all lagging behind 
South Africa. This is shown by the statistically significant and negative d  
coefficients. The trend coefficient a  is positive and statistically significant for all 
three countries. This shows that over time the smaller countries catch-up with 
South Africa. Hence, this confirms that there is b  -convergence in the CMA. All 
the three measures of convergence show that there is evidence of convergence 
among these countries. 
 
2.4.5 Empirical Evidence on Asymmetry in the CMA: Correlation of Growth 
Rates 
 
To measure asymmetry among CMA members I analyse the correlation of 
national annual real GDP growth with that of the whole area. Low or negative 
correlation is interpreted as an indication that member countries are not suitable 
candidates for a monetary union.  
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Table 8 Correlations of growth rates 
Country Correlation with 
CMA growth 
Correlation with 
SA growth 
Lesotho 
Namibia 
Swaziland 
South Africa 
0.25 
0.14 
0.004 
0.99 
0.24 
0.12 
0.004 
- 
 
Table 8 shows that the correlation between South Africa’s growth and that of the 
whole area is higher, very close to one, which is to be expected given that South 
Africa contributes approximately 90% of GDP for the whole area. Lesotho has the 
second highest correlation followed by Namibia. However, the correlation for 
Swaziland is extremely low at 0.004. These differences could possibly reflect 
differences in economic and industrial structures. They also indicate that CMA 
members are likely to face asymmetric shocks. The correlations of growth rates 
between the smaller members and South Africa are not significantly different 
from that with the whole area for Lesotho and Namibia. For Swaziland the 
correlation of growth rates with that of South Africa is actually negative. It is likely 
that this is due to the fact that Swaziland exports above 60% to South Africa. The 
nature of the goods exported is likely to fall as growth rises in South Africa.  
 
Figure 4 GDP growth rates of individual countries and the CMA. 
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Source:World Development Indicators, 2007 
 
Plots of the growth rates, in figure 4, of each member country against that of the 
whole region confirm the correlations reported in table 8 above. 
 
2.4.6 Composition of Exports 
 
The composition of exports is used as another proxy of whether countries will 
face asymmetric shocks or not. From table 8, it is evident that all the countries 
have hardly diversified their export mix as they are all largely dependent on few 
primary goods. Such lack of diversity diminishes the ability to diversify negative 
terms of trade shocks away and is likely to lead to asymmetric terms of trade 
shocks. Debrun et al. (2003) confirm that countries that specialize in a limited 
variety of goods and are therefore less diversified, as is the case in the CMA, are 
more likely to face large asymmetric shocks. Table 8 below presents the export 
products of the CMA member countries. 
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Table 9 Composition of exports in the CMA 
Countries Export Products 
Lesotho 
Namibia 
South Africa 
Swaziland 
Textiles and apparel assembly.  
Fish, gold and diamond. 
Gold, platinum and automobile assembly. 
Sugar, sugar derivatives and textiles 
Source: African Development Bank Report, 2006 
 
The differences in the composition of exports together with variations in world 
prices of these export commodities are likely to result in asymmetry in terms of 
trade shocks in the CMA. Evidently, prices of gold, platinum, and other minerals, 
for example, have surged since the 1990s, which means improving terms of trade 
for South Africa and Namibia. At the same time, prices of textiles have continued 
to plummet. This has resulted in weakened terms of trade for Lesotho because 
textiles account for a large amount of the country’s exports. For Swaziland, sugar 
prices have fallen and preferential treatment in various markets has either been 
reduced or lifted, leading to deterioration in terms of trade. Wang et al. (2007) 
analysed correlation in the terms of trade for CMA member countries as a 
measure of asymmetry. They found that the terms of trade are not well 
correlated.  
 
The differences in the composition of exports are related to the differences in 
industrial structures in the CMA shown by the contribution of each sector to 
output. Differences are an indication that countries will be impacted differently by 
industry specific shocks. For example, a shock in the agricultural sector is likely 
to affect Lesotho and Swaziland more than it would the other countries. Table 8 
shows that Lesotho and Swaziland are highly dependent on agriculture, a sector 
that is highly vulnerable to shocks, compared to South Africa and Namibia. South 
Africa and Namibia are highly dependent on services and industry which also 
contribute a lot to output for Lesotho and Swaziland.  
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Table 10 Structure of output by sectors (%) for CMA Countries, 2005. 
Countries Agriculture Industry Manufacturing Services 
Lesotho 
Namibia 
South Africa 
Swaziland 
16.9 
9.8 
2.8 
12.3 
43.3 
31.6 
30.5 
46.7 
20.3 
13.5 
18.8 
38.3 
39.8 
58.6 
66.8 
41.0 
Source: African Development Bank Report, 2006. 
 
The low correlation of growth rates and the differences in composition of exports 
in the CMA indicate that business cycles in the area are likely to be asymmetric. 
This, according to OCA literature, implies that these countries would incur huge 
adjustment costs should they form a monetary union. Does this mean that these 
countries, though highly integrated, should not move towards forming a fully-
fledged monetary union? In an attempt to answer this question, in section 2.5 
show the correlation of business cycles among South African regions. These 
regions are subject to the same Reserve Bank policy yet they seem to have 
asymmetric business cycles. This supports the idea that asymmetry of business 
cycles should not stop countries forming a monetary union hence being 
subjected to a single monetary policy. 
 
2.5. Business Cycle Synchronisation among South African Provinces 
 
South African provinces have different industrial structures hence, economic 
structures. Table 11 shows the differences in the contributions of different 
industries to total industrial output. Some regions’ reliance on agriculture is higher 
while some show heavy reliance on tertiary industries. These differences suggest 
that these regions are prone to face asymmetric shocks. Hence, their business 
cycles are likely to be asynchronised, which suggests the use of a single 
monetary policy across provinces may not be appropriate. 
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Table 11 Structure of output by industries for South African Provinces, 2003 
Province Primary Secondary Tertiary 
Eastern Cape 
Free State 
Gauteng 
Kwazulu-Natal 
Limpopo 
Mpumalanga 
Northern Cape 
North West 
Western Cape 
0.025 
0.154 
0.030 
0.069 
0.279 
0.252 
0.358 
0.319 
0.047 
0.216 
0.176 
0.250 
0.287 
0.087 
0.274 
0.070 
0.107 
0.237 
0.758 
0.670 
0.70 
0.644 
0.634 
0.474 
0.572 
0.574 
0.715 
Source: Statistics South Africa Database, 2002 
 
Table 12 shows how correlated the growth rates of South Africa’s provinces are 
to the national growth rate. High correlation would be an indication that the 
different provinces face symmetric shocks. This would mean that their business 
cycles are highly synchronised. The correlations show Limpopo province growth 
rate is negatively correlated with that of the country as a whole. This means that 
these business cycles move in opposite directions. The Northern Cape Province 
has a very low correlation of 0.05 with that of the whole country. These two cases 
indicate that the two provinces’ business cycles are not synchronised with those 
of the other provinces.  
 
Table 12 Correlations of growth rates for South Africa and the Provinces 
Provinces Correlations with National growth 
Eastern Cape 
Free State 
Gauteng 
Kwazulu-Natal 
Limpopo 
Mpumalanga 
Northern Cape 
North West 
Western Cape 
0.81 
0.78 
0.70 
0.75 
-0.33 
0.71 
0.05 
0.58 
0.81 
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Source: Own generated results based on GDP growth rates obtained from 
Statistics South Africa Database, 2002. 
 
When business cycles are less correlated the effectiveness of a common 
monetary policy for stabilisation purposes is hindered. It is likely to correct the 
instability in one region while worsening the situation in the other region. 
However, this does not necessarily mean that if business cycles appear to be 
asynchronised then the provinces should have independent Central banks. Other 
adjustment mechanisms, such as flexible labour and capital markets and fiscal 
transfers, can be used as shock absorbers. 
 
Correlations of growth rates in the CMA are very low indicating asynchronised 
business cycles. Economies of the CMA have very strong ties and all the 
convergence measures used in the study find both nominal and real 
convergence. Asymmetries in business cycles should not hinder progress 
towards creation of a currency union within the CMA. As alluded to above, 
countries may need to find other adjustment mechanisms to facilitate recovery 
whenever shocks occur in the area. Creating a fully-fledged union in the CMA 
can be part of the African Union strategy of strengthening regional integration. It 
can be used to facilitate setting up a monetary union for the SADC region and 
later a wider African currency union. In the next section I consider if the SADC 
region is getting ready to adopt the common currency by 2018 by assessing if 
there is convergence and any existing asymmetries. 
 
2.6. Convergence and asymmetry in SADC 
 
The Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) was 
established in 1980 and it became the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) in 1992. The 13 member countries are Angola, Botswana, 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (Congo DR), Lesotho, Malawi (Mal), Mauritius 
(Maur), Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa (SA), Swaziland, Tanzania (Tanz), 
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Zambia (ZA), and Zimbabwe. SADC, being an important element of the African 
Economic Community, aims to promote regional integration, peace, and security 
in the region.  
 
Tavlas (2007) highlights several differences among SADC countries. These 
include; size, economic structures, and composition of exports whose prices do 
not move closely together. These countries show very low shares of intra-SADC 
trade mainly because of; low per capita incomes that constrain internal market 
size, high concentration on few primary goods for exports, poor infrastructure 
connecting population centres and the large presence of the informal sector. 
South Africa is the dominant country as it accounts for about 67% of total SADC 
GDP and is comparatively more industrialised and more diversified. 
 
According to Jefferis (2007) the African Union has in principle concurred to put 
into operation a monetary union and a single currency by the year 2021. This 
plan hinges on the establishment of regional monetary unions that will afford 
building blocks for the Africa-wide monetary union. In this section I assess if 
essential economic and monetary variables such as, per capita incomes, inflation 
rates, growth rates, and interest rates are converging in the SADC region. Such 
convergence is a necessary element in creating a more conducive environment 
for the operation of a successful currency union. 
 
In some of the analysis Angola, Congo DR, and Zimbabwe are excluded owing to 
data unavailability and unreliability due to economic instability, civil war, and 
internal strife. I define SADC to exclude the CMA countries for this analysis. The 
data are sourced from the International Financial Statistics, World Development 
indicators, IMF Zambia country office reports, and African Development Bank 
statistics pocket book. 
 
Figure 5 demonstrates that in the 1990s per capita incomes for Botswana and 
Mauritius surpassed that of South Africa. On the other hand, incomes of the rest 
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of the SADC countries continue to lag behind those of the CMA countries. 
Angola, Botswana, and Mauritius show convergence with incomes of the CMA. 
For Angola, this could be as a result of the oil reserves, while Botswana and 
Mauritius have continued to post robust economic performance due mainly to 
their successes in their mining and tourism industries respectively. The rest of 
SADC countries show no convergence in per capita incomes as opposed to the 
convergence displayed by the CMA countries. This non-convergence could be 
explained by a variety of factors. Firstly, most of these economies are small and 
less diversified, which leaves them vulnerable to external shocks. Secondly, 
some of them have been through major civil wars and internal strife which have 
created major economic instabilities. Finally, performance of the agricultural 
sector, the backbone of their economies, has been poor due to adverse weather 
conditions. 
Figure 5 GDP per capita for SADC countries (in thousands constant 2000 US$) 
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Source; World Development Indicators, 2007 
 
 
 
45
The results displayed in table13 show that like the smaller members of the CMA, 
SADC countries start off lagging behind South Africa as indicated by the negative 
sign of d . However, overtime standards of living for most of the SADC countries 
are converging towards those of South Africa, the benchmark. Congo DR, 
Zambia, and Zimbabwe display continued divergence. For Zimbabwe the 
divergence is likely to be a result of the economic crisis that has hit the economy 
in recent times. Zambia faced a major macroeconomic crisis in the early 90s 
which eventually forced the country to undertake an IMF structural adjustment 
programme.  
 
 
Table 13 b -Convergence in SADC 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Countries 
Parameters 
d  a  2R  S.E 
Angola 
 
Botswana 
 
Congo DR 
 
Malawi 
 
Mauritius 
 
Mozambique 
 
Tanzania 
 
Zambia 
 
Zimbabwe 
-1.45 
(0.021) 
-0.93 
(0.018) 
-2.36 
(0.018) 
 
-3.121 
(0.023) 
-0.70 
(0.016) 
-3.22 
(0.023) 
-2.61 
(0.021) 
-2.04 
(0.014) 
-1.54 
(0.022) 
0.0009 
(0.0014) 
0.054 
(0.001) 
-0.05 
(0.001) 
 
0.005 
(0.0015) 
0.045 
(0.001) 
0.030 
(0.002) 
0.011 
(0.001) 
-0.010 
(0.001) 
-0.009 
(0.002) 
0.84 
 
0.99 
 
0.93 
 
 
0.50 
 
0.97 
 
0.95 
 
0.87 
 
0.85 
 
0.88 
0.051 
 
0.043 
 
0.038 
 
 
0.056 
 
0.038 
 
0.055 
 
0.024 
 
0.034 
 
0.054 
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I plot inflation and interest rates in SADC in figure 6, to ascertain if there is any 
monetary integration in the SADC region. Botswana, Mauritius, and South Africa 
exhibit co-movement in inflation rates. For the rest of the SADC countries, their 
inflation rates have, until the late 90s, been much higher than those in the CMA. 
Interest rates for SADC countries display weak co-movement with those for the 
CMA, which are much lower. This behaviour of inflation and interest rates, 
especially in the poor SADC members, signifies weak monetary integration 
among them and the CMA member countries. 
 
Figure 6 Inflation rates 
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Source: International Finance Statistics, 1979-2007 
 
Results from an error-correction model for inflation and interest rates in table 14 
also support the weak monetary convergence in SADC as displayed in figure 6 
above. Weak monetary convergence is revealed by the deviations of inflation and 
interest rates from those of South Africa, captured by g , which tend to persist for 
most SADC countries. 
 
Table 14 Error-Correction results 
 
 
Botswana Malawi Mauritius Tanzania Zambia 
 
tp  
 
tr  
 
tp  
 
tr  
 
tp  
 
tr  
 
tp  
 
tr  
 
tp  
 
tr  
b  
 
g  
1q  
2q  
0.82 
(0.20) 
0.33 
(0.10) 
-0.75 
(0.12) 
-0.20 
(0.09) 
-0.04 
(0.11) 
0.46 
(0.12) 
-1.02 
(0.12) 
-0.29 
(0.62) 
0.71 
(0.09) 
-0.42 
(0.14) 
-0.38 
(0.08) 
-0.36 
(0.35) 
4.19 
(6.72) 
 
 
-0.32 
(0.16) 
0.31 
(0.22) 
0.30 
(0.09) 
 
-0.005 
(0.02) 
-0.91 
(1.40) 
0.90 
(0.31) 
 
-0.32 
(0.29) 
-5.66 
(10.27) 
 
-0.46 
(0.14) 
-4.02 
(5.67) 
0.71 
(0.12) 
 
-1.38 
(1.07) 
5.22 
(5.74) 
 
0.003 
(0.008) 
0.45 
(0.11) 
0.51 
(0.18) 
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2R  
S.E 
AI
C 
0.90 
1.75 
4.20 
0.81 
1.24 
3.47 
0.91 
6.58 
6.86 
0.72 
4.43 
6.05 
0.90 
2.24 
4.65 
0.56 
0.26 
0.35 
0.61 
3.34 
5.45 
0.82 
1.89 
4.32 
0.96 
9.20 
7.52 
0.71 
0.10 
-1.48 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
Having established that there is weak nominal convergence in the SADC region I 
measure real convergence using correlations of growth rates and by comparing 
the composition of exports. South Africa, Botswana, and Mauritius exhibit some 
co-movement in growth rates, as displayed in figure 7 below, from the year 2000 
onwards which can be taken as an indication that these countries’ business 
cycles are becoming more and more synchronised. Economic growth for the low 
income countries has been poor due to factors such as wars, adverse weather 
conditions and poor policy decisions. 
 
Figure 7 Growth rates in SADC 
-.04
.00
.04
.08
.12
.16
.20
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Bots Maur S A
-.15
-.10
-.05
.00
.05
.10
.15
.20
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
SA Tanz ZA Mal
 
Source: World Development Indicators, 2007 
 
The correlation between SADC member countries growth rates and that of the 
CMA and South Africa is shown in table 15. Angola, Congo DR, Mozambique, 
Tanzania, and Zambia have higher growth correlations with both South Africa 
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and the whole CMA. This could be explained by the dependence of these 
countries on South Africa, the larger and dominant economy in SADC. These 
economies have for a long time either faced internal strife or wars or adverse 
weather conditions which hampered growth of their economies. It is likely that 
shocks facing South Africa will be propagated to these countries. As a result, 
their business cycles will move together with that of South Africa.  
 
Table 15 Correlations of SADC, CMA and South Africa growth rates  
Countries CMA South Africa 
Angola 
Botswana 
Congo DR 
Malawi 
Mauritius 
Mozambique 
Tanzania 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
0.253 
0.058 
0.398 
-0.022 
-0.243 
0.478 
0.322 
0.432 
-0.106 
0.437 
-0.050 
0.480 
0.062 
-0.293 
0.487 
0.353 
0.494 
-0.107 
 
Botswana, a member of SACU, has a low but positive correlation with the CMA 
and a low negative correlation with South Africa. The economies of Botswana 
and Mauritius have continued to record impressive growth rates, above those of 
the CMA countries. In Botswana, this has been mainly driven by the mining 
sector while in Mauritius it has been the textiles and tourism industries. Having 
looked at the growth correlations I look at the composition of exports to assess if 
countries are likely to face asymmetric shocks. 
 
Table 16 Exports composition and trade partners for SADC countries 
Country Exports Export partners Import partners 
Angola 
 
 
 
Crude oil, diamonds, 
refined petroleum 
products. Gas, coffee, 
sisal, fish and fish 
US, China, France, Taiwan 
and South Africa (4.6%). 
 
 
Portugal, US, South 
Korea, China, Brazil, 
South Africa (6%), 
France and the UK. 
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Botswana 
 
 
Congo DR 
 
 
 
 
Malawi 
 
 
 
Mauritius 
 
 
Mozambique 
 
 
 
Tanzania 
 
 
Zambia 
 
 
 
Zimbabwe 
products, timber and 
cotton. 
Diamonds, copper, 
nickel, soda ash, meat 
and textiles. 
Diamonds, copper, 
crude oil, coffee and 
cobalt. 
 
 
Tobacco, Tea, Sugar, 
cotton, coffee, peanuts, 
wood products and 
apparel. 
Clothing and textiles, 
sugar, cut flowers, 
molasses and fish. 
Aluminium, prawns, 
cashews, cotton, sugar, 
citrus, timber and bulk 
electricity. 
Gold, coffee, cashew 
nuts, manufactures and 
cotton. 
Copper/cobalt, 
electricity, tobacco, 
flowers and cotton. 
 
Platinum, cotton, 
tobacco, gold, textiles 
and clothing and 
ferroalloys. 
 
 
European free Trade 
Association (EFTA), SACU 
(7%), Zimbabwe. 
Belgium, China, Brazil, US, 
Finland, France and 
Zambia. 
 
 
Germany, South Africa 
(10.5%), Egypt, Zimbabwe, 
US, Russia and 
Netherlands. 
UK, UAE, France, US, 
Madagascar, Italy and 
Belgium. 
Italy, Belgium, Spain. 
South Africa (12.2%), UK 
and China. 
 
China, India, Netherlands, 
Germany and UAE. 
 
Switzerland, South Africa 
(12%), Thailand, Congo 
DR, Egypt, Saudi Arabia 
and China. 
South Africa (35.1%), 
Cong DR, Japan, 
Botswana, Netherlands, 
China, Italy and Zambia 
 
 
SACU (74%), EFTA, 
and Zimbabwe. 
 
South Africa (22.2%), 
Belgium, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe, France, 
Kenya, US and Cote 
d’Ivoire. 
South Africa (36.4%). 
India, Tanzania, US 
and China. 
 
India, China, South 
Africa (7.4%). 
 
South Africa (38.1%), 
Australia and China. 
 
 
China, Kenya, South 
Africa (7.6%), India 
and UAE. 
South Africa (47.4%), 
UAE, China, India 
and UK. 
 
South Africa (50.6%), 
China, US and 
Botswana. 
Source: SADC trade statistics, 2005  
 
SADC countries rely on a few, mainly primary, commodity exports, such as 
agricultural produce and mineral resources as shown in the table 16. This lack of 
diversification of exports and reliance on primary products in the region means 
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that countries are more vulnerable to external shocks due to international market 
price fluctuations. From the differences in the composition of exports, economic 
structures, and stages of development, SADC countries are more likely to face 
asymmetric shocks. Even if they were to face the same shocks, it is more likely 
that their economies would be affected differently due to these existing 
dissimilarities. 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
 
Adopting a common currency by countries is perceived as a more staid and long-
lasting commitment. This is because it prohibits member countries from engaging 
in competitive devaluations. It also encourages foreign direct investment as well 
as long-term relationships among members. Moreover, it also encourages 
political integration. As a result, trade, economic, and financial integration 
intensify, which results in synchronisation of business cycles. This tends to boost 
economic performance as evident in the Euro area. 
 
This paper has confirmed that countries in the CMA have strong ties. Firstly, 
there is strong evidence of nominal convergence depicted by the behaviour of 
interest rates and inflation rates. This suggests that the financial sectors in the 
area are highly integrated and there is harmonisation in setting interest rates. 
Secondly, there is a fall in dispersions in per capita income overtime. This 
suggests that the smaller countries in the area are catching up with the larger 
country, South Africa. By forming a fully-fledged monetary union, CMA countries 
are likely to derive more benefits associated with such groupings. These include 
a more stable macroeconomic environment hence, high economic activity, low 
unemployment rates, and higher investment emanating from coordination and 
harmonisation of macroeconomic policy in the region. 
 
Empirical evidence also shows that CMA countries are likely to face asymmetric 
shocks. This is supported by the low correlation between individual countries’ 
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growth rates and that of the entire area, with the exception of South Africa. 
Furthermore, these countries export different products, which suggest that they 
are likely to face dissimilar terms of trade shocks. Based on the OCA criteria, 
when countries are prone to asymmetric shocks they are not suitable candidates 
for a currency union because they would face high adjustment costs. However, 
the existence of asymmetric adjustments among member countries does not 
provide sufficient reason against a move towards a monetary union.  
 
To back this claim, I use correlation of growth rates among South African 
provinces to argue that low correlation of business cycles should not stop 
countries from forming monetary unions. Instead, adjustment mechanisms must 
be put in place to reduce costs for individual countries should they be subject to 
asymmetric shocks. Moreover, it is argued in the OCA literature that the OCA 
criteria are endogenous and dynamic. This means that the net benefits of a 
monetary union increase after joining the union because trade integration and 
business cycle correlations are enhanced. 
 
A monetary union in the CMA is likely to further enhance economic integration 
and induce changes in economic, financial, legal, and institutional structures in 
the CMA. Such a move in the area could facilitate much needed economic 
structural reform in the smaller members, especially Lesotho and Swaziland 
whose economies continue to falter. Given the foregoing, then the CMA is better 
off moving ahead to form a fully-fledged monetary union. Such a move can also 
be seen as a stepping stone for the creation of a SADC wide monetary union 
hence, an Africa-wide monetary union as envisaged by the African Union. 
 
Empirical evidence shows that even though some countries in SADC show 
convergence in per capita incomes most are still lagging behind incomes of the 
benchmark, South Africa. There is also a weak indication of monetary 
convergence in the region based on the behaviour of inflation and interest rates. 
These are lower in the CMA compared to most of the rest of SADC countries. 
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SADC is also prone to exhibit asynchronised business cycles mainly due to 
asymmetric shocks that economies are likely to face. Countries are different in 
economic size, structures, and level of economic development. This could mean 
that even in the face of similar shocks, these economies will be affected in 
dissimilar ways and thus require country-specific responses. The results 
therefore indicate that even though the CMA countries form a convergence club, 
the same cannot be said about the SADC region. 
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Chapter 3  
 
The Transmission of Shocks in the CMA: A Structural Macro-
model 
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
The chapter formulates and estimates a macroeconomic model which captures 
the transmission of shocks in the Common Monetary Area (CMA). The CMA 
comprises Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, and Swaziland. These countries have 
very strong economic links, which date back to the colonial era. The other CMA 
currencies are pegged one to one to the South African rand while monetary 
authorities in South Africa float the Rand against other major currencies. The 
CMA is dominated by South Africa, which accounts for over 90% of the whole 
area’s GDP, trade, and population. It is not a fully-fledged monetary union 
because there is no common central bank, pool of reserves, and regional 
surveillance of domestic fiscal and structural policies. In principle, each country is 
responsible for its own monetary policy. However; monetary policy set in South 
Africa, and based on that country’s objectives, de facto applies to the entire area. 
 
This chapter provides an analysis of how shocks are transmitted across the CMA 
and how smaller members are affected by South Africa’s response to those 
shocks. Furthermore, I assess the economic performance of smaller members if 
they are subjected to a single monetary policy. Such an investigation considers if 
CMA countries, especially the smaller members, are likely to derive even higher 
benefits by forming a monetary union. Dellas and Tavlas (2005) and Hughes-
Hallett and Weymark (2001) argue that the costs of being subjected to a single 
monetary policy tend to be higher due to the nature of existing asymmetries, 
nominal and real rigidities among potential members. Such asymmetries and 
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rigidities, due to different institutional, financial, and industrial structures, have an 
impact on the effectiveness and suitability of a single monetary policy for the 
entire area. 
 
The macro-model I develop in this chapter is based on models by Svensson 
(1997 and 2000) and Ball (1997, 1999). It summarizes in quantitative form a 
description of the economic structure and it consists of four equations. Firstly, is 
the Phillips curve equation, which provides the supply side that is consistent with 
inflation inertia. Secondly, an open economy IS curve equation which describes 
the demand side in each country. Thirdly, there is the exchange rate equation 
which is an uncovered interest parity condition. Lastly, there is a policy rule of the 
Taylor (1993), type which allows for the elimination of the money market 
equilibrium function, the LM curve. This rule specifies how the central bank 
manipulates the interest rate in order to attain its inflation and other objectives. 
 
In multi-country models such as Mckibbin and Sachs (1988,1989), Mckibbin and 
Wilcoxen (1998) and Mckibbin (1998), countries are linked through goods and 
financial markets. This is necessary in order to analyse the transmission of 
shocks among the countries. Following these models, I link CMA countries via 
three channels. Firstly, they are linked through the goods market as portrayed in 
the IS specification of the model, which takes into account the fact that CMA 
countries have very close trade links with South Africa. Secondly, they are linked 
in inflation rates; this is depicted in the specification of the expectations 
augmented Phillips curve. Due to the heavy reliance on imports from South 
Africa, the smaller countries import inflation from the dominant partner. Finally, 
these countries are linked through interest rates via the monetary policy rule 
because monetary policy for the entire area is de facto set in South Africa. This is 
due to the fixed exchange rate prevalent in the area. 
 
I assess if a single monetary policy is appropriate for the entire CMA countries, 
given their inherent differences and very strong economic links. To this end, I 
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estimate separate monetary policy rules for the smaller countries. This is useful 
in judging if these countries perform better under a single rule or separate rules. I 
compute volatilities from the simulations under the two monetary policy rules to 
measure which of the rules is more suitable. For the country specific rules, 
monetary authorities will manipulate the nominal interest rate, which is positively 
related to its own lag, the real exchange rate, output gaps, and deviations of 
inflation from target. 
 
The results show that inflation in the small countries is mainly driven by that of 
South Africa. Domestic factors have limited influence on the small countries’ 
inflation processes. Except for Lesotho, I find that monetary policy has an effect 
on output in South Africa and Swaziland. Furthermore, there is evidence of 
interest rate smoothing by the South African Reserve bank. The model 
simulations show that macro-variable volatilities under one or country specific 
monetary rules will differ depending on the nature of the shock countries face. A 
move towards a fully-fledged monetary union has to take into account these 
differences in order to ensure that a single monetary policy rule is designed to 
benefit all countries. 
 
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows: section 3.2 presents the 
theoretical model which captures the key elements for the monetary policy 
transmission mechanism in the CMA. The empirical results and simulations are in 
section 3.3 and 3.4 respectively. Section 3.5 presents the macro volatility 
analysis under the two different monetary policy rules. Section 3.6 provides the 
conclusion. 
 
3.2 Theoretical Model  
 
This model is a simple structural macroeconomic model that adequately allows 
consideration of key features of the economy that are essential for monetary 
policy analysis. According to Berg, Karam and Laxton (2006), models of this type, 
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with some variations, are being used by a number of central banks today, 
especially those pursuing inflation targeting. These models tend to be consistent 
with the way policymakers view the world, where there exists nominal and real 
rigidities. These rigidities result in aggregate demand affecting output in the short 
run. Expectations are viewed as crucial in output and inflation outcomes in the 
economy. Moreover, monetary authorities follow a specified monetary rule where 
the nominal interest rate is the instrument of policy. In some instances the results 
of these small macro-models are compared with results obtained from large 
macroeconomic models. 
 
Currencies in the area are pegged one to one to the Rand. According to Masson 
and Pattillo (2004), monetary policy in the CMA is set by monetary authorities in 
the dominant larger partner, based primarily on that economy’s objectives. This 
makes the arrangement asymmetric. Hence, the model captures the asymmetric 
nature of the arrangement by augmenting equations of the smaller countries with 
variables of the larger country. The equations for the larger country do not feature 
variables of smaller members. 
 
The model consists of equations for aggregate demand, Phillips curve, the 
exchange rate, and a monetary policy rule. These relations govern the time paths 
of the endogenous variables; output, the price level, the exchange rate, and the 
nominal interest rate. Berg, Karam and Laxton (2006) argue that emphasis must 
be placed on the need for monetary policy to present an anchor for inflation and 
inflation expectations. They further acknowledge that due to nominal and real 
rigidities that exist in economies, aggregate demand will only affect output in the 
short run. As noted by Ball (1997), this class of models emphasizes that there are 
lags in the effects of policy as well as inertia in inflation. The equations of the 
model are as follows: 
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Eq. (1) specifies the open economy Phillips curve for the larger country and eq. 
(4) for each of the smaller countries denoted by j. In eqs. (1), (3) and (4) ty  is the 
output gap at year t, teD  is the change in the (log) real exchange rate which 
captures the import cost effect, tp  is the (log) price level, tpD  is the inflation 
rate, *pD is the inflation target, f  measures firms who are forward looking in their 
inflation forecasts and m  measures credibility of the target rate of inflation. Both 
m  and f  are ]1,0[Î , b  and q  are positive and tz  and tq  represent cost push 
shocks, for example, oil price shocks.  
 
As in Fisher and Whitley (2000), eq. (1) allows for price stickiness attributable to 
contractual obligations and regulations among firms, employers and employees. 
In eq. (1) inflation is related to inflation shocks, past and expected inflation, 
output gap, and the lagged change in the exchange rate. Ball (1999) explains 
that the real exchange rate impacts inflation via import prices. Based on Laxton 
et al. (1998) and Fisher and Whitley (2000), expectations are formed based on 
past and target levels of inflation as specified in eq. (2). The coefficient on 
expected inflation must be positive to ensure that the monetary authorities cannot 
consistently fool the public.  
 
Eq. (4) takes into account the imported inflation from the larger country captured 
by the last term in this equation. This term captures the impact of the heavy 
reliance of smaller countries on imports from the larger country. There is also no 
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exchange rate in this equation as it is set in the larger country and currencies are 
pegged one to one within the CMA. 
 
Eq. (5) is the open economy IS specification for the larger country where ti  is the 
nominal interest rate, te  is the real exchange rate gap and tg  is a demand shock 
which shifts the IS curve. The lagged output is used to support the existence of 
persistence in output due to habits or consumption determination. In eq. (5) 
output is serially correlated, increasing in the real exchange rate and decreasing 
in the real interest rate gap captured by the parameter s . This IS specification, 
as in Senda (2005), has lags in order to make the demand shock to cause a 
trade-off between the variances of inflation and output.  
 
tttttt gepiyy ++D--= ---- 1111 )( asd      (5) 
 
The IS for each of the smaller countries is presented in eq. (6) and it includes the 
lagged output gap for South Africa which, captures demand emanating from the 
larger country. This term captures the impact of the heavy reliance of smaller 
countries on exports to the larger country. There is also no exchange rate in this 
equation because it is pegged one to one within the CMA. 
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The exchange rate adjustment mechanism for the large country is described in 
eq. (7), where te  is the real exchange rate gap, 
f
ti  is the US nominal interest 
rate, ti  is the domestic (dominant partner) nominal interest rate and te  
represents shocks in the foreign exchange market.  
 
        (7) 
For the larger country, the exchange 
rate is a function of the real interest rate differentials, between the larger country 
t
e
tt
f
tt
f
tt eppiie eg +-D-D--= + ])()[( 1
 
 
60
and the US as well as the expected exchange rate. Based on Berg, Karam and 
Laxton (2006), expectations of the exchange rate will be formulated by agents 
based on a target exchange rate *te  and what the exchange rate was the 
previous period as shown in eq. (8). Given that the exchange rate is fixed and it 
is the monetary authorities in the larger country that protect the rand against 
other currencies, the smaller countries in the CMA only follow eq. (10). They 
manipulate their interest rate in order to ensure that the parity is maintained. Here 
tv  is a shock that captures temporary deviations from the parity due to domestic 
factors.  
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Eq. (11) specifies the monetary policy rule that is applicable to both the large and 
the small countries. The nominal interest rate ( ti ), depends positively on its lag 
1-ti , to allow for interest rate smoothing, deviation of inflation from target, output 
gap, and the exchange rate. In this equation 0>pj , 0>yj  and 0>ej .  
 
The small countries’ central banks will manipulate their nominal interest rate to 
the extent that they have deviations of their interest rates from that of the larger 
country due to domestic factors. This is shown by eq. (10) where tv  captures the 
domestic factors. Clarida et al. (1999) argue that since the nominal interest rate is 
the instrument of policy, it is not necessary to specify the condition for money 
market equilibrium, the LM curve. Svensson (2000) points out that the reaction 
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function for an open economy will also include foreign variables such as, foreign 
inflation, output, and interest rates, because these impact on the domestic 
economy. Senda (2005) argues that the shock in eq. (11), tx  can be interpreted 
as a monetary policy mistake such that if the central bank makes no policy 
mistakes then tx  =0. 
 
3.3 Empirical Analysis 
 
3.3.1 Data description and properties 
 
The data I use in this chapter, as shown in table 17, is annual data from 1975-
2006. It is mainly sourced from the World Development Indicators (WDI) and 
International Financial Statistics (IFS). Some of the variables are expressed in 
gap terms using the HP filter to approximate the potential variables. I have left 
Namibia out of the analysis due to data inadequacy. The data for lending and 
treasury bill interest rates in Lesotho start from 1980 when the central bank was 
set up. For the period 1975-1979 I have therefore used interest rates for South 
Africa. This is justified since, the central bank of Lesotho commenced operations 
in 1980, hence prior to that monetary policy in Lesotho was carried out by South 
Africa.  
 
Table 17 Data and variables description 
Sample 
period 
 
Source 
 
Variables 
 
Description 
1975-
2006 
WDI and IFS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nominal interest rate ( ti ) 
Real Interest rate ( tr  ) 
 
Inflation ( tpD ) 
 
Output gap ( ty ) 
 
Real exchange rate ( te  ) 
Lending rate 
 
Lending interest rate adjusted 
for inflation using GDP deflator. 
GDP deflator (base years vary) 
 
GDP (constant 2000 US $) 
detrended using HP filter. 
Real exchange rate(LCU per 
US$) 
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Following Rudebusch (2002), Svensson (2000) and Ball (1999), I estimate the 
model recursively using OLS. I then simulate the model by subjecting countries to 
a variety of monetary shocks under different monetary policy rules. The 
generated impulse response functions show how macro-variables in the area 
adjust following a shock instituted by South Africa. This is useful as it gives an 
indication of how well a uniform monetary policy is likely to function. The impulse 
response functions produced from the model simulations will be compared with 
those generated using a VAR in the next chapter.  
 
Following standard procedure in the literature unit root tests are conducted for 
the variables in the model as specified in table 17. 
 
Table 18 Unit Root Tests 
Variables                                     ADF Test Statistic            Test Critical values  
South Africa 
Inflation                                            -4.34                                    -3.57 
Output gap                                       -4.18                                    -1.95 
Real interest rate                             -4.66                                     -2.97 
Real exchange rate                         -3.73                                     -2.96 
Swaziland 
Inflation                                            -7.63                                     -2.97 
Output gap                                       -3.59                                     -2.99 
Real interest rate                              -4.61                                     -2.97 
Real exchange rate                          -5.09                                     -2.97 
Lesotho 
Inflation                                             -7.35                                    -3.59 
Output gap                                        -3.28                                    -2.96 
Real interest rate                              -5.25                                     -2.97 
Real exchange rate                          -3.86                                      -2.96  
Note: ADF= Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
 
These test results are presented in table 18. At the 5% level of significance the 
null hypothesis is rejected for all variables. 
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3.3. 2 Analysis of results 
 
Table 19 shows correlations of lending rates, inflation rates, and the output gaps 
in the CMA. Both Lending and inflation rates of the smaller members and South 
Africa are highly correlated. These indicate monetary convergence and how 
closely integrated the financial sectors are in the area, as the smaller countries 
tend to follow closely monetary developments in South Africa. The high 
correlation of inflation rates could be attributable to the inflation targeting pursued 
by South Africa which, in reality applies to the whole area. Monetary convergence 
in the area is one indication that the countries are more likely to be suitable 
candidates for a monetary union. 
 
The output gaps for South Africa and Swaziland display low correlation. For 
Lesotho and South Africa, the output gaps are negatively correlated. These 
observed output correlations could be attributable to differences in size, structure, 
trade flows, and levels of economic development among the countries. Due to 
these differences, it is more likely that these countries will have asymmetric 
business cycles. Since countries will likely face idiosyncratic shocks, the 
implementation of a single monetary policy would be inappropriate. This could be 
solved by setting up other adjustment mechanisms to assist countries deal with 
their country specific shocks. 
 
Table 19 Correlations  
 
Lending rates 
  
Lesotho 
 
South Africa 
 
Swaziland 
Lesotho 
South Africa 
Swaziland 
1 
0.90 
0.68 
 
1 
0.85 
 
 
1 
                  
                 Output gaps 
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Lesotho 
South Africa 
Swaziland 
1 
-0.05 
-0.09 
 
1 
0.21 
 
 
1 
 
Inflation rates 
Lesotho 
South Africa 
Swaziland 
1 
0.99 
0.99 
 
1 
0.99 
 
 
1 
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Table 20 Macroeconomic model empirical results 
 
Phillips curve 
 
IS curve 
 
Monetary policy rule 
 
 
f  
 
m  
 
*pD  
 
b  
 
q  
jq  
AR(1) 
 
Les 
 
S A 
 
SD 
 
 
¶  
 
s  
 
a  
 
ja  
 
 
 
 
 
 
AR(1) 
 
Les 
 
S A 
 
SD 
 
 
ij  
pj  
yj  
ej  
 
 
 
 
 
Les 
 
SA 
 
SD 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.186 
(0.180) 
 
 
0.858*** 
(0.053) 
-0.377 
(0.201) 
0.611** 
(0.248) 
0.392** 
(0.169) 
 
0.106*** 
(0.017) 
 
0.004** 
(0.002) 
-0.064* 
(0.0347) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.00006 
(0.002) 
 
 
0.831*** 
(0.062) 
0.413 
(0.201) 
0.524**
* 
(0.106) 
-0.054* 
(0.0957) 
 
 
 
-0.097* 
(0.230) 
 
 
 
0.672 
(0.270) 
0.516*** 
(0.117) 
-
0.0031*** 
(0.001) 
0.046** 
(0.021) 
 
0.470*** 
(0.114) 
-
0.214*** 
(0.071) 
 
 
 
-
0.452*** 
(0.147) 
 
 
0.950*** 
(0.185) 
0.972*** 
(0.039) 
0.05 
(0.053) 
0.0005 
(0.00070 
0.851*** 
(0.058) 
0.210* 
(0.081) 
0.005*** 
(0.002) 
0.004 
(0.005) 
 
0.844 
(0.071) 
0.241 
(0.095) 
0.003 
(0.001) 
2R  
S.E. 
LM  
HR 
NL 
0.814 
0.029 
1.666 
9.028 
0.312 
0.852 
0.017 
0.084 
2.507 
0.762 
0.504 
0.037 
3.752 
3.986 
1.317 
2R  
S.E. 
LM  
HR 
NL 
0.832 
2.317 
6.070 
7.691 
2.342 
0.731 
1.194 
0 
3.665 
0.954 
0.858 
1.523 
8.673 
9.762 
1.343 
2R  
S.E. 
LM  
HR 
NL 
0.735 
0.018 
2.086 
3.887 
0.846 
0.772 
0.02 
1.059 
3.249 
0.436 
0.742 
0.018 
2.315 
9.331 
1.946 
Note: Les=Lesotho, SA=South Africa and SD= Swaziland. Standard errors are in parenthesis. LM=LM Test Statistic, HR=Heteroscedasticity, and 
NL=Normality 
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From table 20 the Phillips curve results for South Africa show that the parameter 
for forward looking behaviour when forming expectations 0.61. The credibility 
parameter for the monetary authority, the SARB, is 0.39 and is likely to be a 
result of the inflation targeting framework being pursued by the bank. This 
credibility estimate is reasonable, and compares well with other studies, such as 
Berg et al. (2006). The inflation targeting framework stipulates a target of 3% to 
6% and the bank communicates with the public regularly regarding monetary 
policy stance. This is likely to make the process transparent, which would 
facilitate to coordinate inflation expectations towards desired outcomes. 
 
The output gap and real exchange rate coefficients in the South African inflation 
equation are significant though very low. This suggests that domestic sources of 
inflation play a lesser role in the country’s inflation process. Furthermore, the 
pass-through effect of foreign prices on the South African economy is also found 
to be low. The negative sign on the real exchange rate suggests that inflation will 
rise as the exchange rate appreciates. However, the usual belief is the opposite 
but most recently studies, especially on China, have shown that if investors 
expect a high probability of continued appreciation, capital inflows could force 
monetary authorities to accumulate reserves. If these are not sterilised, this could 
lead to an increase in inflation.  
 
In Lesotho and Swaziland, price setting behaviour appears to be following a 
different pattern. This is because the results obtained when using the same 
specification used for the larger country did not make economic sense. For 
instance, the rigidity and credibility parameters I found were above 1. Following 
usual practice in the literature, I then restricted these parameters to take the 
values of 1. However, this did not improve the results and surprisingly South 
African inflation was found to be insignificant in the inflation processes of the 
smaller countries. Given that the smaller countries import about 90% from South 
Africa plus the existent pegged exchange rates in the area, inflation 
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developments in South Africa are expected to play a pivotal role. This is also 
supported by the high correlations in inflation rates in the area alluded to earlier. 
 
I then estimate equations where the inflation process in each of the smaller 
countries depends on their output gaps and the inflation in South Africa. The 
coefficients for the South African inflation in both Lesotho and Swaziland are over 
0.8 and significant. This confirms that inflation in the smaller countries is driven 
mainly by that of South Africa. The smaller countries’ output gap coefficients 
carry the right signs but show that domestic factors are insignificant in their 
inflation processes. 
 
From the aggregate demand results, the real interest rate coefficient is highly 
significant for South Africa and Swaziland. It is insignificant in Lesotho. The habit 
persistence coefficient is higher for South Africa, 0.52 followed by that of 
Swaziland, 0.47 and lower, negative, and insignificant for Lesotho at -0.15. 
Based on Bank of Israel (2007) and Berg et al. (2006), in most economies 
monetary policy gradually affects the output gap as reflected by a positive 
coefficient, usually found to be around 0.5 for the output gap lag. The lower and 
negative coefficient for Lesotho suggests that monetary policy has no effect on 
output. This could be related to a number of factors, including the 
underdeveloped nature of the financial system in the country. South Africa’s 
output gap has a negative effect on aggregate demand in Swaziland and 
Lesotho. This could be related to the nature of trade in the area. Lesotho exports 
very little to South Africa and Swaziland exports about 60% which is likely to 
explain the larger negative effect. This could mean that demand for the goods 
that Swaziland exports to South Africa falls as incomes rise. This is to be 
expected given the nature of goods that Swaziland exports, viz; soft drink 
concentrates, sugar, wood pulp, citrus, and canned fruit. Furthermore, South 
Africa trades mainly with Europe, which accounts for almost half of the country’s 
trade, UK, and Germany 
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Assuming that monetary policy for the entire area is de facto set in South Africa, I 
estimate a monetary policy rule for South Africa which, in effect applies to the 
whole area. The instrument of monetary policy is adjusted based on its past 
value, deviation of inflation from target, the output gap, and the exchange rate. 
The parameter on the lagged policy instrument is high at 0.85 reflecting high 
persistence, which is in line with the literature. According to Clarida et al. (1999) 
and (2000) most central banks will engage in interest rate smoothing to prevent 
unexpected reactions by the financial sector. Smoothing can also induce history 
dependence in monetary policy process, which assists monetary authorities to 
infer economic agents’ inflation expectations. 
 
The coefficient on the deviation of inflation from target is as expected greater 
than the output gap coefficient. This supports the South African Reserve Bank’s 
inflation targeting framework. The real exchange rate is meant to capture the 
openness of the economy but is found to be insignificant. However, Ball (1999), 
Taylor (2001), Svensson (2002), and Berg et al. (2006), found that adding the 
exchange rate in the monetary rule usually makes little difference. They believe 
that it does not add any new information not already captured by the other 
variables. I use the model results to carry out simulations. 
 
I also estimate specific monetary policy rules for the smaller countries based on 
their own variables. This is useful in assessing which of the rules would induce 
higher volatility. Lesotho displays even higher inflation inertia as it has a higher 
coefficient for the interest rate smoothing parameter. That of Swaziland is very 
close to that of South Africa. This could be explained by the fact that Swaziland 
tends to react much faster to interest rate adjustments in South Africa compared 
to Lesotho as indicated in their various central bank monetary policy statements. 
The coefficients for the output gap and the deviation of domestic inflation from 
the target rate are insignificant in both countries. This supports the results found 
for price setting behaviour in each of the smaller countries. 
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I examine if the parameters of the model are stable across a variety of sub-
samples of the data using the CUSUM test. This test plots the cumulative sum of 
the recursive residuals together with the 5% critical lines. Parameter instability is 
likely to exist if the cumulative sum is outside the two critical lines. Figures 
display the tests for the three equations. Overall the results show that there is 
parameter stability for all the equations, except for the Swaziland inflation 
equation. For this equation the cumulative sum goes outside the critical lines at 
some point but it falls back within these lines again. It is more likely that the 
parameter instability is not serious. 
 
Figure 8 CUSUM Stability Tests 
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3.4 Simulation of results 
 
3.4.1 Simulations under a single monetary policy rule 
 
I simulate the model under two different scenarios in order to judge whether 
countries perform better under one monetary policy rule set by South Africa or 
when they set country specific monetary rules. In the model, CMA countries are 
linked through the goods market, price setting, and the interest rate equations. I 
simulate the model by subjecting it to positive 1% shocks, instituted by South 
Africa, to interest rate, and output. 
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Figure 9 Responses to a positive interest rate shock. 
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Figure 10 Responses to a positive output shock. 
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Figure 12 demonstrates how macroeconomic variables respond to a percentage 
shock to the nominal interest rate instituted by South Africa under the single 
monetary rule. In this case, the exchange rate is fixed among the countries and 
the interest rates are the same. Following the shock as theory predicts, both 
output and inflation fall in all the countries with Swaziland showing the largest 
drop in output. Additionally, on impact, the exchange rate appreciates then it 
depreciates gradually. 
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Figure 13 shows that following a percentage shock to output in South Africa, 
inflation in Swaziland and South Africa rises while it falls in Lesotho. This is 
supported by the bigger fall in output for Swaziland compared to that for Lesotho.  
 
3.4.2 Simulations under different monetary policy rules 
 
In this scenario, each country sets its own monetary policy based on domestic 
factors. The nominal interest rate is no longer the same in these countries, thus 
the exchange rate is allowed to vary across countries.  
 
Figure 11 Responses to a positive interest rate shock  
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Exchange rate 
 
 
 
Figure 12 Responses to a positive output shock 
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Under the different monetary policy rules, figure 14 shows that a positive 
percentage shock to the nominal interest rate in South Africa induces a fall in 
inflation in all countries. Compared to the simulation under a single rule, inflation 
for the smaller countries moves very close together. The interest rate falls in the 
smaller countries and output rises in the smaller countries while it falls in South 
Africa. Under a single rule output falls for all countries. The exchange rate 
appreciates at first then it depreciates back to original level overtime. Lesotho 
early on shows some fluctuations in the exchange rate. It is important to note that 
output in Swaziland takes time to converge back. This could be attributable to the 
fact that Swaziland exports over 60% to South Africa, whereas Lesotho exports 
much less. Swaziland is likely to be hit harder by the contractionary monetary 
policy and may take a longer to adjust.  
 
Figure 15 shows that under country specific rules a positive output shock is 
followed by a fall in inflation in Lesotho and a rise in Swaziland and South Africa. 
Interest rates rise in South Africa while in Swaziland it falls and only rises 
overtime. In Lesotho it falls for a longer period before it begins to rise towards its 
equilibrium value. This could be explained by the fact noted earlier that interest 
rates in Lesotho are adjusted slowly compared to Swaziland as a way to try and 
protect the economy from the negative effects that could arise from changes in 
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the interest rate. To judge the appropriateness of each rule I compute macro-
volatilities from the simulation results. 
 
3.5 Macro-volatility under different monetary policy rules 
 
In order to assess if smaller countries perform better under a single or country 
specific monetary rules I compute volatilities for the macroeconomic variables in 
the model by taking the standard deviation of the variables. I employ the 
following formula: 
 
å
=
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-=
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i xxn
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22 )(/1s        (12) 
 
Where: n  is the sample size, x  is the macroeconomic variable. 
 
I then compute volatility ratios based on the volatilities computed using eq.(12). I 
take volatilities under one rule divided by volatilities under different rules. If the 
ratio is greater than 1, it means that using one monetary policy rule relatively, 
produces more volatility in macroeconomic variables as opposed to countries 
facing different country specific monetary rules. If the ratio is below 1, it means 
that country specific rules would produce more volatility. 
 
Table 21 Macro volatility ratios under different policy rules 
 
Variables 
 
Years 
Volatility ratios 
Lesotho       South Africa            Swaziland 
Interest shock 
Output 
 
Inflation 
 
Exchange 
 
 
5 
10 
5 
10 
5 
10 
 
13.7 
7.8 
1.25 
1.17 
2.5 
2.1 
 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
 
12.8 
5.6 
1 
1 
5 
4.4 
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Output shock 
Output 
 
Inflation 
 
 
5 
10 
5 
10 
 
0.66 
0.65 
0.68 
0.68 
 
1 
1 
1 
1 
 
0.68 
0.67 
0.63 
0.58 
Note: Volatility ratio=volatility under same rule/ volatility under country specific rules 
 
Table 21 shows volatilities of macro-variables following a positive percentage 
shock to the nominal interest rate, and output. From the results, the volatility 
ratios following an interest rate shock show that using the same rule induces 
more volatility especially on output. This is indication that the smaller members 
are likely to face costs associated with the use of one monetary policy. However, 
following an output shock the volatility ratios show that country specific rules are 
likely to induce relatively more volatility. 
 
Based on the foregoing, a move by the CMA to form a fully-fledged monetary 
union has to be designed in such a way that could reduce the costs usually 
associated with the loss of monetary policy autonomy particularly for the smaller 
countries. The move could give the smaller members a say in the formation of 
monetary policy in the area so that the likely asymmetric shocks are recognised. 
This is because in a monetary union, there would be an independent central 
bank which would form monetary policy with a focus on the whole area. Over and 
above that in a monetary union some adjustment mechanisms are put in place to 
cushion countries against asymmetric shocks. These could be in the form of 
fiscal transfers to bail out affected countries and flexibility in labour markets to 
allow free movement of labour in the area. 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I used a macroeconomic model to capture the transmission of 
monetary policy shocks in the CMA. The model consists of four equations 
namely: the Phillips curve, IS curve, exchange rate and a monetary policy rule. 
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To assess the transmission of monetary shocks I linked the countries via the 
goods market, price setting, and the monetary policy instrument. I specified a 
monetary policy rule, which describes monetary policy in the area. To gauge if 
this monetary rule is appropriate for the whole area, I estimated country specific 
rules for the smaller countries. Comparing simulations of the model under the two 
sets of rules helped to evaluate the volatilities under the two sets of rules. 
 
Empirical evidence from the model confirmed that inflation processes are 
different in the area with that of the smaller countries largely driven by that of 
South Africa. Output in the smaller countries is negatively related to that of South 
Africa. I found that including the exchange rate in the monetary policy rule makes 
very little difference to the equation parameters, a result that is found by other 
similar studies such as Ball (1999), Taylor (2001), and Svensson (2002). 
Simulations of the model under the two monetary policy rules showed that the 
appropriateness of a single rule depends on the nature of shocks. This means 
that a move towards a fully-fledged monetary union must take into account the 
likely presence of some asymmetric shocks in the CMA. The existence of these 
shocks suggests the need to put in place alternative adjustment mechanisms to 
assist countries and also ensure the continued existence of the monetary union. 
These could include fiscal transfers and capital and labour market flexibilities. 
 
In the recent past, the smaller members have been pushing the dominant partner 
to modify the CMA in an effort to enable them to have an input in monetary policy 
setting. Members have also continued to discuss the possibility of transforming 
the current arrangement to become a fully-fledged monetary union. The empirical 
evidence shows that the costs of such a move are unlikely to be large  
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Chapter 4  
 
Monetary Policy Shocks in the CMA: A Structural VAR Approach  
 
4.1. Introduction  
 
In this chapter I present a widely used technique to analyse monetary policy 
impact on an economy, the structural VAR approach. This technique allows 
transformation of the reduced-form VAR model into a system of structural 
equations using economic theory. Further, the impulse responses and variance 
decompositions derived from this technique are given structural interpretations. 
Stock and Watson (2001) point out that the structural VAR uses economic theory 
to sort out the contemporaneous links among variables. 
 
The VAR is useful in determining how well the theoretical model fits the data for 
the countries in the CMA. It indicates if the restrictions implied by the model are 
valid. It is also helpful in determining if there are other channels through which 
the economies are linked that are not captured by the model. The model links the 
countries via the aggregate demand, inflation and the interest rate equations. 
 
Initially the VAR approach was developed by Sims (1980) and has been widely 
used and modified. Interest in this approach among economists grew because 
there was continued disagreement on the true nature of structures of economies 
versus what was implied in the atheoretical VAR analysis. Many believed this 
approach could bring out some crucial dynamic characteristics of the economy 
without imposing any restrictions implied by certain economic theory.  
 
This led to the development of the structural VAR approach by Blanchard and 
Watson (1984), Bernanke (1986) and Sousa and Zaghini (2006), among others. 
They identify two advantages of using this approach. One is that it can be used 
to model non-recursive structures of the economy with a parsimonious set of 
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variables. It also enables the interpretation of the contemporaneous correlations 
among disturbances. Bernanke (1986) argues that the structural VAR differs from 
the standard VAR by Sims (1980), in that it orthogonalizes the estimated VAR 
residuals into the true underlying structural disturbances. The standard VAR uses 
the standard Choleski decomposition to obtain the residuals which, he argues, 
implies a certain specific underlying structure of the economy 
 
According to Bernanke et al. (2004), structural VARs though widely used to 
analyse monetary policy actions on the economy, encounter some problems due 
to the limited information they use. Measurement of policy innovations is tainted 
when there appears to be information known to policymakers and private agents, 
but not incorporated in the VAR. It has been argued in the literature that the use 
of limited information is responsible for the observed price and exchange rate 
puzzles in the analysis of monetary policy effects on the economy. Further, only 
impulse responses for included variables are observed, yet policymakers, private 
agents and researchers are interested in a whole spectrum of variables not 
captured in VAR analysis. 
 
Moreover they point out that different identification of monetary policy shocks 
lead to different inferences regarding the shape and timing of variable responses. 
According to Kuttner and Mosser (2002), the VAR approach deals with 
unanticipated changes in monetary policy and not anticipated changes yet these 
in the literature are found to be important. It is due to these shortcomings that this 
study will only use VAR as a robust check on how well the data fits the model 
specified earlier. 
 
Regardless of its shortcomings the VAR approach remains very useful. I use it to 
ascertain the fit of the theoretical model. The VAR system I use contains the 
following variables: inflation rate, output gap, nominal interest rate and the 
exchange rate. It is informed by the theoretical model which provides a simplified 
description of the economy which captures the essential variables for the 
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analysis of monetary policy. The identification restrictions are also informed by 
the theoretical model developed earlier. The impact of unanticipated policy 
shocks on other economic variables is analyzed using impulse response 
functions.  
 
The principal finding is that a contractionary monetary policy shock results in a 
fall in output and an appreciation of the exchange rate on impact. Contrary to 
economic theory, inflation in South Africa and Lesotho rises on impact. This price 
puzzle has been found in a number of studies including Sims (1992), Leeper et 
al. (1996) and Christiano et al. (1998). Various ways have been used to correct 
for this such as, including current and lagged commodity prices, exchange rates, 
import price index and monetary aggregates in the VAR system. Such variables 
capture information about future inflation which is known to monetary authorities. 
Ravenna and Walsh (2004) put forward that the price puzzle can be explained 
using the cost channel of monetary policy transmission. In this study I included 
the exchange rate but the results did not change much. However, the price 
puzzle is not so pronounced and prolonged which is in line with previous studies. 
 
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows: Section 4.2 describes the 
specification of the VAR followed by section 4.3, which details the identification 
scheme for the VAR. Section 4.4 presents the results and section 4 concludes. 
 
4.2 Specification of the VAR approach 
 
4.2.1 Generalities about VAR 
 
A VAR is often used for forecasting systems of interconnected time series and 
examine the dynamic impact of unsystematic disturbances on the system of 
variables. According to Sims (1980), Blanchard and Watson (1984), Bernanke 
(1986) and Boivin and Giannoni (2002) formally a reduced form VAR is a system 
of equations that can be represented in matrix form as follows: 
 83
tktktt uYAYAaY ++++= -- ........11       (13) 
 
In eq. (1) the vector tY  as specified below in matrix form in this study consists of 
four variables. There are three macroeconomic variables namely output gap, 
exchange rate and the price level. These are the variables the study is focussed 
on. There is then the policy variable, the interest rate, which details the reaction 
function of the monetary authorities. All these are based on the equations 
specified earlier in the structural model. The vector of innovations or impulses tu  
includes supply, and demand disturbances as well as shocks in monetary policy. 
The evolution of this vector tY  depends on stochastic shocks denoted by tu  plus 
a systematic component denoted by ktkt YAYAa -- +++ ....11  which captures the 
propagation of shocks throughout the economy. 
 
The vector of constants denoted by a and kAA ,...,1  are matrices of coefficients 
that can be obtained by applying ordinary least squares (OLS) separately to each 
part of equation (1). They capture the propagation mechanism of the economy 
and are allowed to be different from zero to allow each of the structural 
disturbances to affect all the variables in tY . In other words this matrix, Blanchard 
and Watson (1984) argue, typify the contemporaneous relations between 
variables. tu  is a vector of shocks which Bernanke (1986) refers to as primitive 
exogenous forces because they do not have a common cause and are not 
directly observable by the analysts. As such these shocks are 
contemporaneously uncorrelated with mean zero. The variance-covariance 
matrix of this vector is given as: 
 
å=E uttuu )( '          (14) 
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It is a diagonal matrix. The estimate of å u is the sample covariance matrix of 
the OLS residuals. Following Blanchard and Watson (1984) and Bernanke (1986) 
to attain identification restrictions are imposed on the vector kAA ,...,1  using the 
theoretical model and the covariance matrix of the structural disturbances is 
presumed to be diagonal. 
 
4.2.2 Specification of the VAR 
 
I specify a structural VAR system in matrix form. I examine the behaviour of 
inflation, output, interest rate and the exchange rate in the CMA. The VAR 
specification is based on the macroeconomic model developed earlier, the 
economy is characterised by a set of four equations; a Phillips curve, aggregate 
demand, exchange rate and monetary rule. The VAR system presents a very 
basic account of the economy but it contains the necessary variables vital for the 
analysis of monetary policy. This is in line with most studies using the structural 
VAR approach such Blanchard and Watson (1984) and most studies done for the 
Euro area, such as Kim and Roubini (2000), Mojon and Peersman (2001), 
Peersman and Smets (2001), and a study on New Zealand by Buckle et al. 
(2003).  
 
The system for the smaller countries is extended with variables from South Africa 
reflecting the dependence of the smaller members on developments in South 
Africa. The model on which this VAR is based links the countries via the 
aggregate demand, inflation and the interest rate equations. This is in line with 
Kakes et al. (1998)and Dungey and Fry (2000) who argue that small open 
economies are affected by developments from abroad hence their VAR systems 
ought to be augmented with foreign variables. A number of techniques are used 
to ensure that the VAR is identified. However, I use restrictions implied by the 
theoretical model to achieve identification.  
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The subscript j and 5 to 7 refers to the block of variables for each of the smaller 
members. In the matrices 1 to 4 refers to the South African block of variables and 
the rest refers to variables for the smaller countries. The system contains four 
variables namely: pD is the inflation rate, y  is the output gap, i  is the nominal 
interest rate and e  is the real exchange rate. Each variable is explained by a 
structural equation that has an error term. The error terms, shown in the matrix, 
are labelled according to the structural equations from which they derive. The 
vector of shocks is denoted by tm . Bernanke (1986) refers to the shocks as 
primitive exogenous forces because they do not have a common cause and are 
not directly observable by analysts. As such these shocks are 
contemporaneously uncorrelated with mean zero. The variance-covariance 
matrix of this vector is given as: 
 
å=E uttuu )( '          (17) 
 
It is a diagonal matrix. The estimate of å u  is the sample covariance matrix of 
the OLS residuals. Following Blanchard and Watson (1984), Bernanke (1986), 
and Blanchard (1989), to attain identification, restrictions are imposed using the 
theoretical model and the covariance matrix of the structural disturbances is 
presumed to be diagonal. 
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4.3 Identification Scheme 
 
In the literature several standard identification schemes are used to analyse the 
impact of unanticipated changes in monetary policy on main macroeconomic 
variables. Sims (1980), Mojon and Peersman (2001), and Peersman and Smets 
(2001) among others, use the standard Cholesky decomposition to orthogonalize 
the reduced form disturbances. This approach to identification assumes that the 
true economic model is recursive. Other authors such as, Blanchard and Watson 
(1984) Bernanke (1986), suggested a generalised method, the structural VAR, 
with non-recursive contemporaneous restrictions. I follow the latter method to 
recover the parameters in the structural equations from the estimated reduced 
form equations. 
 
The set of identifying restrictions I use are derived from the theoretical model 
specified earlier. Similar to Cushman and Zha (1997), Zha (1999), Mojon and 
Peersman (2001), and Bhuiyani (2008) for the smaller countries South African 
variables are taken as exogenous which follows from the small country versus 
large country assumption. These exogenous variables are allowed to have a 
contemporaneous impact on the endogenous variables in the VAR system. The 
inflation rate in South Africa has an influence on that of the smaller countries. 
Also, output in South Africa influences output in the smaller countries. This is 
because of the strong trade links among CMA countries, as the smaller countries 
import over 80% from South Africa and Swaziland even exports about 60% to 
South Africa. Furthermore, the exchange rate is fixed within the CMA as 
currencies of the smaller countries are at par with the rand. The monetary rule 
pursued by South Africa is assumed to apply to the whole area. 
 
Following recent literature I use the nominal interest rate as an instrument of 
monetary policy. This is also in line with the inflation targeting framework followed 
by the South African Reserve bank. The bank manipulates the nominal interest 
rate to achieve its target inflation range of 3-6%. The framework de facto applies 
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to the entire CMA due to the fact that currencies of the smaller countries are at 
par with the rand. I set out the monetary policy rule as a function of the lag of the 
nominal interest rate to allow for interest rate smoothing, deviation of inflation 
from target, output gap, and the exchange rate. According to Kim and Roubini 
(2000), the exchange rate in the monetary policy feedback rule captures the fact 
that some countries will be concerned about the consequences of their currency 
depreciation on their inflation rates.  
 
4.4. VAR Estimation Results 
 
This section presents the data I use in the VAR system. I also present the 
estimated VAR model results as well as the impulse responses, which according 
to Blanchard (1989) show the dynamic reaction of the endogenous variables to 
structural shocks  
 
4.4.1 Data description and properties 
 
I use annual data from 1975-2006 sourced mainly from the WDI and IFS. 
Following Blanchard (1989) the variables in the system are specified in levels 
and first differences which is informed by the specification of the macroeconomic 
model. The variables in the system are stationary. According to Stock and 
Watson (2001) the lag length is usually determined using the Akaike information 
criteria or the Bayes information criteria in the literature. I use one lag due to the 
fact that I use annual data. These variables are: logarithm of the GDP deflator 
(first difference) tpD , output gap which is GDP (detrended using HP filter) ty , the 
real exchange rate gap (expressed as LCU per US$) te , and ti  is the lending 
(nominal) interest rate.  
 
Following standard practice in VAR analysis I run Granger causality tests, which 
according to Stock and Watson (2001), examine whether lagged values of one 
variable assist to predict another variable.  
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Table 22 Granger Causality tests 
                                                         Dependent Variables 
Regressors                            tpD                     ty                              ti  
South Africa 
SA Inflation                                                                                                        0.06 
SA Interest rate                         0.05                       0.003 
Les Inflation                               0.02 
SD Output                                  0.08                                                                 0.003 
SD Interest rate                         0.05                       0.01                                    0.0002 
Swaziland 
SA Output                                  0.04 
Les Inflation                               0.07                       0.09 
SA Inflation                                                              0.03 
SA Exchange rate                                                   0.06 
SA Interest rate                                                                                                 0.03 
Lesotho 
SA Inflation                                0.0007 
SA Output                                                               0.004                                  0.06 
SA Exchange rate                                                                                              0.02 
SA Interest rate                                                                                                  0.00 
Les Output                                  0.07 
SD Output                                                               0.04 
Les Interest rate                                                      0.007 
Note: Les=Lesotho, SA=South Africa and SD= Swaziland. All variables were found to be 
insignificant in predicting the exchange rate hence; it is not reported in table 1. 
 
In table 22 I present the Granger-causality results where I report p-values related 
to the F-statistics for testing whether the relevant sets of coefficients are zero. I 
present results for those variables found to be significant at the conventional 
significance levels. I find that the South African interest rate, Lesotho inflation, 
Swaziland output and interest rates help to predict inflation in South Africa. 
Inflation in South Africa as well as output in Lesotho assists in forecasting 
inflation in Lesotho. Lesotho inflation as well as output in South Africa is 
instrumental in predicting inflation in Swaziland. This finding supports the earlier 
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finding that inflation in South Africa drives inflation in the smaller countries of the 
CMA.  
 
Interest rates in South Africa and Swaziland facilitate prediction of output in 
South Africa. Lagged values of Lesotho and South Africa inflation as well as the 
exchange rate help predict output in Swaziland. To forecast Lesotho output 
lagged values of South Africa output, Swaziland output and the interest rate in 
Lesotho are helpful. Lastly, I find that interest rate in South Africa is helpful in 
predicting interest rates in the smaller countries. This behaviour of interest rates 
as well as inflation in the area supports the nominal convergence established 
earlier for the CMA. 
 
I also present variance decompositions in table 23. Stock and Watson (2001) 
point out that variance decomposition indicate the percentage of the variance of 
the error in forecasting the variables in the VAR system due to specific shocks. 
Using structural factorization, the results in table imply substantial interaction 
amongst the variables. The results show that roughly 33% and 67% of the error 
in the forecast of inflation in South Africa is attributed to shocks in the other 
variables in the structural VAR in period 2 and 10 respectively. Approximately 
28% and 43% of the error in the inflation forecast in Lesotho is due to shocks in 
the rest of the variables in the system. This is similar to what obtains in the 
inflation forecast in Swaziland. 
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Table 23 Variance Decompositions 
Forecast horizon         Standard error                                                Variance decomposition ( percentage points) 
                                                                                                           
Shocks                                                                1             2             3              4             5            6            7             8          9          10 
 
South Africa  
Inflation 
1                                    0.027                           100          0             0             0              0              0         0            0           0           0 
5                                    0.042                           44.3         2.8          12.7       1.9           12.2         1.3      3.5          0.4       5.1        15.9 
10                                  0.049                           33.4         9.5          14.6       2.3            9.1          1.2      3.4          0.3       6.0        20.2 
Output 
1                                   1.499                            0.7         99.3           0            0             0              0           0            0           0         0 
5                                    2.690                           6.9         47.2          1.5         17.2       2.7            1.5        0.3         0.9        6.0       15.8 
10                                  2.874                           9.2         44.8           2.1        15.7       3.9            1.4        0.5         0.9        6.1       15.4 
Exchange rate 
1                                   0.859                            9.7         1.7           88.6         0            0              0            0          0            0           0 
5                                   1.393                            3.8         10.8         59.1         0.1        2.2            0.5         3.8       0.2        0.2        19.2 
10                                 1.551                            3.1         11.5         50.7         0.1        2.2            1.2         4.7       0.3        0.2        25.8 
Interest rate 
1                                   0.020                            0.6          4.2            9.8        85.5        0              0            0          0           0           0 
5                                   0 043                            8.4         18.8           5.0        30.3       3.5            0.5         0.4       1.9        4.2        27.2 
10                                 0.046                            7.6         19.4           7.5        27.0       3.4            0.5         1.1       1.7        4.1        27.7 
Lesotho 
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Inflation 
1                                   0.052                           30.5         0              0            0          69.5            0            0          0           0           0 
5                                   0.072                           19.9         2.5           2.1         0.2       60.4            3.2         1.5       0.2        0.9        9.0 
10                                 0.075                           18.8         3.7           2.9         0.3       56.9            3.1         1.6       0.2        1.0       11.4 
Output 
1                                   3.556                             3.9         5.4           0            0           7.3            83.4        0         0            0           0 
5                                   5.605                            12.9       18.0          1.1         1.5        7.7            37.4        3.9      1.4         8.9        7.1 
10                                 6.156                            12.3       18.2          3.2         4.1        7.4            31.4        3.4      1.3         11.7      7.2 
Interest rate 
1                                   0.009                            0.5         0              0.3          2.9       1.7              1.3         93.3     0           0           0 
5                                   0.039                            7.5         28.0         5.6         18.1      3.3              0.3           6.5     0.8        6.4        23.5 
10                                 0.040                            7.9         27.7         6.0         17.6      3.6              0.5           6.3     0.8        6.3        23.2 
Swaziland 
Inflation 
1                                   0.043                              2.4         0              0             0           0                 0            0          97.6      0        0 
5                                   0.059                              2.4         1.6           0.8          2.8        23.4            1.0         1.6       57.0      3.5     5.7 
10                                 0.060                              2.8         1.9           0.9          2.9        23.3            1.1         1.6       56.1      3.8     5.7 
 
Output 
1                                2.601                                  0.1         36.0        0             0            0                0            0           2.4       61.5    0 
5                                4.206                                  4.3         18.3        9.7          0.2         10.3           0.8         0.9        2.4       46.5    6.7 
10                              4.321                                  4.4         18.4        11.5        0.2          9.9            0.8         0.9        2.3       44.8    6.6 
 
Interest rate 
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1                                0.022                                  0.1          1.3         5.9          51.5       0                0            0          3.6        0.3      37.3 
5                                0.037                                  3.7          8.8         5.6          23.5       0.7             0.6         1.6       4.7        0.6      50.2 
10                              0.039                                  3.6          10.0       8.1          21.7       0.9             0.6         1.9       4.3        0.8      48.2 
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Finally, figure 13 shows the inverse roots of the characteristic AR polynomial. It 
shows that the estimated VAR is stable. This is because all the roots have 
modulus below one and lie inside the unit circle.  
 
Figure 13 AR Roots 
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The number of roots is given by the number of endogenous variables multiplied 
by the largest lag. This means that there are ten roots as there are ten 
endogenous variables and one lag. The stationarity of the VAR means that the 
estimated results, such as the impulse standard errors, are well-founded.  
I have established that the estimated VAR results are appropriate. I now present 
the impulse response functions 
 
4.4.2 Impulse responses 
 
Impulse response functions provide the dynamic response of the endogenous 
variables to innovations in the structural disturbances. Each figure provides point 
estimates and one standard deviation bands. The confidence intervals for the 
impulse response functions are generated using various methods in the literature 
such as the analytical and Monte Carlo, and bootstrap after bootstrap 
approaches. I use the analytic asymptotic method. I focus on how demand 
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shocks and interest rate shocks from South Africa affect variables of the smaller 
countries.  
 
From figure 14, following a one-standard-deviation contractionary interest rate 
shock, output falls immediately in South Africa and Swaziland. In Lesotho, output 
rises on impact and falls after sometime. Inflation in South Africa and Swaziland 
rises on impact until period 3 and then starts to fall. In Lesotho inflation falls 
marginally on impact. The exchange rate appreciates on impact and depreciates 
gradually back to its initial level.  
 
Traditional theory predicts that a contractionary monetary policy shock leads to a 
fall in both output and inflation. However, figure 1 shows that inflation in South 
Africa and Swaziland increases initially and then falls following this shock. The 
rise in the price level following a contractionary monetary policy is referred to as 
the price puzzle in the literature. According to Sims (1992), Balke and Emery 
(1994) and Christiano et al. (1998), possible explanations for the price puzzle are 
that monetary authorities react to expected higher future inflation and supply 
shocks by increasing the policy interest rate. However, they assert that the 
interest rate increase falls short to offset the inflationary consequences. The VAR 
system, they claim, tends to lack information on future inflation which would be 
known to the policymakers. 
 
Barth and Ramey (2001) and Ravenna and Walsh (2004) identify a cost channel 
of monetary policy transmission. This channel, they argue, is another possible 
explanation of the price puzzle. It exists if firms’ marginal costs depend on the 
nominal interest rate. Following a contractionary monetary policy shock the firms’ 
marginal costs rise and in the very short run leads to increased prices which 
eventually falls as aggregate demand decreases. 
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Figure 14: Impulse responses due to interest rate shock from South Africa 
 
-.015
-.010
-.005
.000
.005
.010
.015
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
South Africa inflation
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
South Africa output
-.4
-.2
.0
.2
.4
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
South Africa exchange rate
-.02
-.01
.00
.01
.02
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Lesotho inflation
-2
-1
0
1
2
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Lesotho output
-.02
-.01
.00
.01
.02
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Swaziland inflation
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Swaziland output
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 96
Figure 15 Impulse responses due to output shock from South Africa 
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Following an output shock, as shown in figure 15, inflation falls gradually in all 
countries on impact. Interest rate rises for all countries and output in the smaller 
countries decreases. Following Dungey and Fry (2000)’s findings in their multi-
country structural VAR model, the behaviour of output in the smaller countries 
can be explained by their trade relations. They found that Japan, the bigger 
country, imports a lot from Australia, the smaller country. This meant that a rise in 
Japan output would lead to a rise in Australian output. Swaziland and Lesotho 
rely heavily on South African imports. A rise in demand in South Africa is likely to 
lead to a fall in output of the smaller countries. The exchange rate depreciates on 
impact and appreciates gradually to initial level.  
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4.5 Conclusion  
 
This chapter used a structural VAR approach to analyse the effects of monetary 
policy shocks on the economies of the CMA countries. The VAR system and the 
identification restrictions are informed by the theoretical model developed earlier. 
In the VAR system variables of the dominant partner, South Africa, influence 
those of the smaller countries and not the other way. I chose one lag structure for 
the VAR since I used the same annual data from the macro-model. The VAR 
results were useful in providing a robustness check on how well the theoretical 
model fits the data. I generated impulse response functions by subjecting the 
system to interest rate and output shocks.  
 
The results from the VAR generally compare well with those from the theoretical 
model. However, the results show that contrary to traditional economic theory, a 
contractionary monetary policy leads to a rise in prices. Studies by Barth and 
Ramey (2001) and Ravenna and Walsh (2004) and others have proposed that 
most of the research on the transmission of monetary policy shocks have 
concentrated mainly on the demand side. This means that important supply-side 
or cost-side monetary policy effects have not been explored. These studies 
argue that the empirical puzzles usually observed in the transmission of 
monetary policy can possibly be explained by these supply side effects. 
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Chapter 5  
 
Conclusion and Policy Recommendations 
 
This study contributes to the discussions on monetary integration that has been 
at the forefront in economic policy discussion agendas mainly because of EMU 
the world over. In Africa one of the principles of NEPAD, the operational arm of 
the AU, is the acceleration of regional and continental integration so that Africa 
can act collectively in order to diminish marginalisation in the global economy. 
According to the Central Bank of Swaziland (2006) the AU has set a deadline 
that by 2025 Africa will have a common currency and central bank. This means 
that all existing regional economic communities must be enhanced so that they 
can act as springboards for the Africa wide integration. The CMA, the focus of 
this study, has been in existence for a long time and there has been some 
discussion changing it to a fully-fledged monetary union 
 
The study examined the extent to which economies of the CMA are converging 
as well as the likelihood that they face asymmetric aggregate shocks. 
Macroeconomic convergence and asymmetric adjustments to shocks are critical 
issues as the CMA visualizes a move towards fully-fledged monetary union. 
Countries in the area show strong evidence of nominal convergence as shown by 
the behaviour of interest rates and inflation rates. This shows that the financial 
sectors in the area are integrated. Dispersions in per capita incomes have also 
been falling in the area overtime. This indicates that the smaller countries are 
somewhat trying to catch up with the larger dominant country, South Africa. 
 
Based on presence of convergence in the area OCA literature indicate that 
countries are likely to derive more benefits from forming a fully-fledged monetary 
union. Empirical evidence supports the existence of asymmetric shocks in the 
area based on the low correlation of growth rates as well as the differences in the 
composition of exports. As business cycles will not be synchronised it would 
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mean that the use of a single monetary policy as a stabilisation tool would not be 
suitable for all countries as they will face different shocks. However, such a 
situation should not preclude CMA countries from forming a monetary union, but 
instead should indicate that there have to other adjustment mechanisms that will 
be used to bail out countries in the event they face dissimilar shocks. The 
differences in economic structures also require that other adjustment 
mechanisms are enacted because even similar shocks are likely to affect 
countries in differing ways. This could be in the form of fiscal transfers from a 
fund where all countries contribute or allowing labour and capital mobility in the 
area. Furthermore, it is indicated in some studies that countries may not meet the 
OCA criteria before they form a monetary union, but the criteria are endogenous 
and dynamic. This means that the benefits are likely to increase after forming the 
monetary union because economic, financial, legal, and institutional structures 
are likely to be augmented as the integration intensifies. 
 
The economic structural augmentation and reform that could be enjoyed by 
member countries after forming the monetary union would be most beneficial for 
the smaller countries in the CMA whose economies face major challenges such 
as low economic activity. Success of the CMA monetary union would also be a 
stepping stone for the anticipated SADC wide monetary union. Empirical 
evidence from the study shows weak convergence and asynchronised business 
cycles in the SADC region. This has implications for the transmission of shocks 
in the region and should inform the formulation and implementation of a 
sustainable SADC wide monetary union. 
 
The study formulated a macroeconomic model to capture the transmission of 
monetary policy shocks in the CMA using the four main equations namely; the 
Phillips curve, IS curve, exchange rate and a monetary policy rule. The VAR was 
estimated to check how well the theoretical model fitted the data. The results 
showed that volatilities due to the use of one rule as opposed to country specific 
rules were insignificant. This means that subjecting the countries to one 
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monetary policy rule would not be so costly especially for the smaller members 
so long as the presence of asymmetric shocks is acknowledged and provided for 
as alluded to above. 
 
Based on the analysis the overall conclusion is that the monetary union is 
possible in the CMA. It is also likely, given the close relationships that these 
countries have had for a long time, that moving towards a fully-fledged monetary 
union would be less costly. However, the evident asymmetric shocks countries 
are likely to face suggest that the process needs to be phased in gradually. 
Firstly, there is a need to set clear convergence criteria that needs to be met and 
maintained by all members, especially on the fiscal policy side. Secondly, there is 
a need to introduce flexibility in the labour market in order to allow for alternative 
adjustment mechanisms to deal with asymmetric shocks. Thirdly, countries 
should consider setting up a common pool of reserves to assist those countries 
who might need assistance due to shocks that might have hit their economies. 
Lastly, there is a need to ensure political commitment and support for the 
process by all member countries in order to ensure sustainability of the monetary 
union. 
 
The study did not apply the macroeconomic model to the SADC region in order 
to assess the transmission of monetary policy shocks in the region. This could 
indicate if a single monetary policy for the region would result in less or more 
economic volatilities. It could be useful to apply the model in SADC in order to 
inform discussions around the SADC wide monetary union. It can also be useful 
to find a precise way of enumerating the costs and benefits of being in the CMA, 
especially for the smaller members. 
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Appendix 1 
 
Table 22 Selected Average Economic Indicators for CMA Countries (2000-2009) 
Indicators Lesotho Namibia South 
Africa 
Swaziland 
Population (millions) 
GDP, current prices (Billions US$) 
GDP per capita. current prices 
(US$) 
GDP growth rate 
Inflation, average consumer prices 
(% change) 
Unemployment rate (as % of total 
labour force) 
2.3 
1.2 
504.2 
 
3.3 
7.3 
 
45 
1.9 
6.5 
3285.1 
 
4.5 
7.4 
 
21 
47 
211 
4470.5 
 
3.6 
6.1 
 
26 
1.01 
2.2 
2185 
 
2.3 
7.6 
 
30 
Source: World Economic Outlook, 2010 and World Development indicators 2010. 
